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During the last decade, our minority population has been
able to make dramatic strides toward achieving a greater degree
of freedom and equality in most aspects of the American way of
life. For the black segment of this minority population, to whom
this study is directed primarily, this freedom has been over 100
years in coming.
Although total equality in the areas of employment,
education, housing and the political process still has not been
fully realized in the years since the issue of school desegre-
gation was raised nationally in the 1950's, enough progress has
been made to allow the focus of emphasis to shift somewhat from
more individual freedoms to more collective ones . Some have
termed this a desire for a more significant "piece of the
action"— a greater collective involvement in the American
economic mainstream that has always been beyond their grasp.
The concept of "Black Capitalism" made its first public
appearance, in terms of true awareness by the majority popula-
tion, at a meeting of the Urban Coalition in Washington, D.C.
in the summer of 196 8. It was during this time that the
violence and destruction by the militant arm of the Black Power
Movement had reached epidemic proportions . From the Birmingham
riots in 1963 through the destruction of the Shaw District in

2our nation's capital in 1968, deaths were totaling in the
hundreds and property damage in the hundreds of millions of
dollars. In a span of but a few- days, 3^ deaths and over $35
million in property damage occurred in the Watts area of Los
Angeles alone. Black and white leaders alike sought an end to
this violence which was further widening the chasm of under-
standing between the races and also leaving the ghetto dwellers
in a worse economic, social and political condition.
The Urban Coalition meetings became one of the key
means by which the civil rights movement was shifted from
destruction to construction. The black leaders replaced the
need for more employment with the need to create opportunities
for blacks to own, develop and manage their own businesses
as the number one priority of the civil rights movement. When
Roy Innes , a leader of the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE)
and also a recognized spokesman of the wave of militancy
prominent at the time, publically endorsed the concept of Black
Capitalism in that same year, the full impact of this shift in
emphasis by the great majority of black leaders was fully
recognized as a possible solution to the problems that beset
2both the majority and the minority populations. To the white
community, capitalism was a concept well-understood and
"Financing Minority Businesses," The RMA Occasional
Paper Series (Philadelphia: Robert Morris Associates, undated),
p. 7.
2George T. Burtt, "Reading for Proof," review of Black
Capitalism: Strategy for Business in the Ghetto , by Theodore L.
Cross , in the Financial Executive" XXXVIII (September, 1970), 8.

3and presented an approach by which both the public and private
sectors might finally be able to truly assist the minorities.
To the blacks, capitalism might be the means by which they could
achieve the autonomy, independence, wealth, self-determination
and self-esteem they had desparately sought through the Black
Power Movement, but with disastrous results. It might also be
the means to break the shackles of economic dependency which
had kept them on the verge of a permanent welfare state, in
spite of their other newly won freedoms
.
Yet to get from the theoretical drawing boards to
tangible visible results in the streets of the ghetto is another
matter. One of the difficult problems to be resolved, and one
that is still being hotly debated, is to overcome the inherent
distrust many blacks have of the capitalistic system itself.
After all, it was white capitalism that had brought them to
this country in bondage in the first place and now it was sup-
posed to help free them. Some young and highly educated black
leaders feel even today that inherent in any capitalistic system
is a class dichotomy that requires one small and dominant
entrepreneurial group to control and exploit the masses . To
pursue Black Capitalism, a term which has since been changed to
black business development to play down the emphasis on the
word capitalism, will be to just replace a white oppressor by a
black oppressor. In either case the black masses will still be
the exploited. Still, the overwhelming majority of black
leaders highly endorse the concept. Their skepticism, however,

kis focused on the sincerity and commitment of the white man,
and especially any program that has Federal sponsorship.
Since the late 1960's, the Federal government has
created a plethora of programs to assist minority businesses.
As of the summer of 1971, there were 19 major Federal agencies
sponsoring nearly 160 different programs that touch the area
of minority enterprise in some way. Some, like the grazing
association loans offered by the Department of Agriculture, can
hardly be of significance to most minority entrepreneurs.
Others, however, like the Minority Enterprise Small Business
Investment Company (MESBIC) Program, are aimed directly at the




The MESBIC Program was launched with much fanfare,
optimism and predictions by Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans
in 1969. It is based on the premise that there is a serious
capital gap in the minority communities which prohibits black
business development and that can only be overcome by Federal
assistance. It is further based on the recognition that minori-
ties, which comprise 16 percent of our population, own or con-
trol only 3 percent of our nation's business enterprises. Its
purpose is to encourage the majority and minority private
2
sectors to provide more venture capital to minority businessmen.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Federal Programs Assisting
Minority Enterprise (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1971), p. v.
p
U.S. Department of Commerce, HESBICs and Minority
Enterprise (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
197D, p. 3.

5It is believed that by assisting our minorities to participate
more fully in the American economic mainstream, the private
sector can "demonstrate (its) commitment to help resolve one
of this nation's most pressing social problems."
Statement of Research Question
The primary question this study seeks to answer, then,
is whether the MESBIC Program can become a viable mechanism by
which the Federal government can encourage and stimulate the
growth of the black business community by joining with the pri-
vate sector to increase the supply of venture capital to minority
enterprises
.
Before this primary question can be answered properly, it
will be necessary to understand the problems with which the
MESBIC Program is trying to cope. The first of these deals with
the current status of minority enterprises, both qualitatively
and quantitatively, and the extent of the capital gap existing
in the minority communities. The second area of concern is the
degree of responsiveness given to the needs of minority busi-
nessmen by both the majority and minority banking industries.
Third, a brief analysis of the most important Federal programs
dealing with the financial aspects of minority enterprises must
be made in order to show where the MESBIC program does, or does





6V/ith these questions properly dealt with, the mechanics
of the MESBIC program itself can be described and an analysis can
be made of its performance to date and prospects for the future.
Scope of the Study
The MESBIC program is but one of 160 Federal programs to
assist minority enterprises and it works on but one of the four
ingredients necessary for any business venture to achieve viabil-
ity, that of venture and debt capital. The other three ingre-
dients consist of the right man, the proper profit opportunity
and the required degree of managerial and technical expertise.
Although a successful business requires all four ingredients,
studies have shown that new businesses fail due to a lack of a
healthy financial structure, the lack of proper managerial
expertise or a combination of both. This study will deal only
with the financial aspects of minority business development, but
some discussion will be directed toward the managerial assistance
functions a MESBIC is supposed to provide.
Another restriction on the scope of this study is that
although it deals with programs to assist all minority enter-
prises, total emphasis will be placed on the black business
community. This is not meant to imply that other elements of
the total minority population are not as important as the black
segment, it is just that at this time the issue of black civil
rights has been much more violent and visible. Also the black
community is the largest single minority group accounting for

65 percent of the total minority population and over 50 percent
of all minority enterprises.
Purpose and Utility of the Study
The MESBIC program was launched as the first new direct
assistance effort made by the Nixon Administration. Although
under the operational control of the Small Business Administra-
tion, its chief advocate is the Office of Minority Business
Enterprise (OMBE) in the Department of Commerce. OMBE's key
function is to coordinate all Federal agency activity with re-
spect to programs designed to assist in the development of
minority businesses.
One purpose of this study, then, is to see if this
broader coordination effort, under which MESBIC was created, has
given it a better sense of direction and effectiveness than fre-
quently has occurred with other Federal programs that have been
fragmented in central direction by the autonomy of the agencies
administering them.
Another purpose of this study is to see if the MESBIC
program, which is a spin-off of the Small Business Investment
Company (SBIC) program created by the Small Business Investment
Act of 1958, has been properly modified and structured in order
to avoid the pitfalls encountered in the early period of the
latter 's tempestuous history. In other words, is the MESBIC
program just a warmed-over version of the SBIC program relabeled
only for political purposes?
"Nixon Administration Responds to its Black Critics,"
Black Business Digest, II (December, 1971), 15.

8A final purpose is to try to determine whether the
Federal government has properly defined the objectives of its
minority economic development programs. If it has, Is the MESBIC
program a proper delivery vehicle; and if not, can it survive in
spite of its ill-conceived objectives?
The broader utility of this study, then, is to try to
provide insight and, hopefully, a better understanding of whether
we really know what it is we are trying to do for the minority
segment of our population in terms of providing them greater
economic freedom. Pouring good money after bad into programs
that may be doomed to begin with is not only wasteful in an
economic sense, it may also be financing a psychological con-
dition that can further polarize the races.
Research Methods Utilized
Secondary data has been the major source of information
for this study and an attempt has been made to utilize a wide
range of sources to bring as broad a spectrum of opinions to
bear on the subject as time allowed. Further, more emphasis
has been placed on periodical references since the minority
business enterprise area is so new and rapidly changing that
data only three years old can be quite dated with respect to the
current situation.
Primary data, in the form of private interviews with
representatives of Federal agencies, and local quasi-public
and private organizations assisting minority enterprises in the
Washington Metropolitan area, has been used to supplement
secondary data wherever possible.

9Organization of the Study
In Chapter II, the minority business community itself
is examined in both quantitative and qualitative terms. A case
is presented for black business development and a determination
of the reasons causing the wealth gap in the ghetto communities
is attempted.
In Chapter III, the traditional commercial financial
institutions, both minority-controlled as well as majority-
controlled, is analyzed to determine to what extent they have
been responsive to the needs of minority businessmen. Current
trends in these industries with respect to this subject are also
presented.
In Chapter IV an examination is made of the Federal
financial assistance programs, exclusively those of the Small
Business Administration, to assist minority businesses. The
growth and development of SBAs major lending programs is
presented.
In Chapter V is an analysis of the history, growth and
performance of the SBIC industry. The importance of this analysis
is that this industry represents the basic legislative and opera-
tional structure on which the MESBIC program is founded.
Chapter VI deals solely with the MESBIC program itself
to see how it differs from that of the SBIC program and to look
at its development and performance to date. An analysis of the
MESBIC program's current and potential effectiveness is given
both by those who advocate its potential effectiveness and
those who challenge it as to concept and operation.

CHAPTER II
STATUS AND NEEDS OF BLACK BUSINESS
Introduction
Before any Federal assistance program is undertaken
which commits public resources and funds to solve what has been
determined to be a national problem, it is first necessary to
define this problem, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
Only when the problem is so defined can it be determined whether
the programs selected to commit these resources are in fact the
best solutions possible. The purpose of this chapter, then, is
to try to better define the problem the MESBIC program hopes to
solve
.
To do this we will first describe the current status and
profile of the black business community. Next we will examine
the arguments concerning the merits of black business develop-
ment itself. Finally an analysis will be made of the wealth
gap that is said to exist in the black community which severely
restricts the self-development of more viable businesses.
Current Status and Profile of the
Black Business Community
In August of 1971, the Department of Commerce published
the first comprehensive statistical data ever known to be




country. The study, based on 1969 information accumulated by
the Census Bureau and the Internal Revenue Service, leaves little
doubt that our minorities have a rather miniscule "piece of the
action" with respect to sharing in the economic wealth of our
free enterprise system. For example, in 1969 there were approxi-
mately 322,000 minority business enterprises in our country, and
163,000 of those were black owned. Based on an estimation that
there were over seven million total businesses in our country in
1969, this means that all minorities owned or controlled 4 per-
cent of our country's businesses and blacks only 2 percent.
In terms of total sales, the disparity is even greater.
Based on 1967 data, the total receipts of all firms was $1,49 8
billion. Of that amount, all minorities contributed a total
of $10.6 billion and blacks $4.5 billion. This means that black
2firms accounted for only 0.3 percent of all sales made.
A comparison made with data on the billion dollar club
in the May 19 71 issue of Fortune makes an even more graphic
contrast. It was shown that there were 120 companies each re-
porting sales in 1970 of over $1 billion. The bottom eleven
firms alone grossed more than all minority businesses combined.
Furthermore, General Motors, the nation's largest private
business, reported sales of $18.8 billion in 1970, or nearly
twice as much as the total sales of all 322,000 minority
businesses combined. When the dimension of population is added,
U.S., Bureau of the Census, Minority-Owned Businesses:







with blacks representing 11.3 percent of the population, the
white-to-black ratios are 8.8 to 1 in population, ^6 to 1 in
business ownership and 333 to 1 in sales volume.
Although the above figures are quite dramatic, they do
little to provide a comparative profile of black-owned businesses
with those of all businesses . Table 1 shows a comparison of
black owned firms to all firms, by type of industry, with re-
spect to number of firms and total receipts. As can be seen,
black businesses are concentrated in the retail and service
trades, with a total of 58 percent of all business receipts in
these categories. They are least prevalent in the fields of
finance, manufacturing, wholesale trade, and transportation and
other public utilities. Yet their percentage of total receipts
to the total business community even in the retail and service
trades is still only 1.7 percent.
On an individual city basis, a recent survey of the
Washington, D.C. area has provided the following profile of
black businesses as of late 1968:
1. The population of Washington is 70 percent black
yet blacks own only 12 percent of all businesses.
2. Most of the black-owned businesses are in the service
and retail areas.
ln The Black-White Dollar Gap," Black Business Diges t, II
(December, 1971), 21.
p
Maury Seldin and Michael Sumichrast, "Negro Entrepre-
neurship in the District of Columbia," (from an unpublished
study Survey of Business Ownership in Washington, D.C.
,
prepared
for the~Small Business Administration by the Homer Hoyt Institute
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m3. Most black-owned businesses are one-to-two man oper-
ations while white businesses employ an average of 6.6 persons.
One-quarter of all black businesses have no paid employees, where-
as one-quarter of all white businesses employ 20 or more people.
4. The median sales volume of all black businesses
was less than $25,000 per year, in contrast to a white business
sales median of $185,000 per year.
5. Most blacks acquired their business over ten years
ago and during the last ten years there was nearly an equal
trade-off between blacks acquiring white businesses and vice
versa. In summary, then, we can picture the typical black
business as a one man, retail- or service-oriented, ghetto-
located operation that is barely able to support the proprietor
and his family let alone contribute to the economic development
of the black community.
The Case for Black Business Development
With a profile as bleak as that presented in the pre-
ceding section, it is easy to conclude that the black business
community is not now even close to becoming a viable means of
improving the economic status of our black citizens. But the
issue of what should be done about stimulating a more viable
black business community is far from being clearly defined,
especially among the black citizens themselves. The debate
varies from one extreme of those who contend that any attempt to
further the achievements of black capitalism will only result in
a deeper economic enslavement of the black masses. At the other

15
end of the continuum are those who believe that increased black
business development can provide the only means of giving the
black population the benefits of the full and equal citizenship
it seeks .
Black sociologist E. Franklin Prazer has been one of the
renowned contemporary critics of the black capitalists movement.
As he wrote in Black Bourgeoisie , "The myth of Negro business is
tied up with the belief in the possibility of a separate Negro
economy ... of course, behind the idea ... is the hope
of the black bourgeoisie that they will have the monopoly of
the Negro market." This implies that capitalism in any form
will always tend to exploit the masses and that in fostering the
growth of black capitalism, the white master will merely be
2
replaced by a black master representing the black business elite.
Followers of this line of thinking cite the fact that
there have been many attempts made to stimulate black business
development throughout our nation's history. Philadelphia's
Free African Society was founded in 1787 by leaders of the black
community to give it a more unified voice in the city's economic
affairs. In 1865, the Freedman's Bank was established by
Congress to help the country's new black citizens learn the white
man's disciplines of thrift and saving. Booker T. Washington,
in 1900, organized the National Negro Business League to
stimulate the interest in and creation of more black businesses.
E. Franklin Frazer, Black Bourgeoisie (New York:
Collier Books, 1957), p. 139-
2Earl Ofari, The Myth of Black Capitalism (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 10.
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All of these attempts to develop a viable black business com-
munity either ended in total failure or further exploitation of
the black masses. The only real solution to the plight of the
black masses, according to the extreme anti-black capitalism
followers, is to do away with our imperialistic economic system
and replace it with a communization of all available resources
in the black community. This will require a total class outlook
2toward the black liberation movement.
The foregoing denouncement of black business development
is still held by a relatively few number of individuals; but
this type of thinking does have some influence on the problem.
Moving up from this end of the continuum is a more prevalent
viewpoint which does not question the necessity or merits of a
more viable black business community. Rather it challenges
the belief that business development is the black peoples
'
most urgent priority. Andrew F. Brimmer, who became the first
black governor of the Federal Reserve Board when so appointed by
President Lyndon Johnson in 1966, believes that the number one
issue facing the black community is increasing the employment
opportunities in the area of more meaningful and intellectually
challenging work
.
Brimmer believes that the decade of the 1970s will offer
greatly expanding economic opportunities for which the black
people must be prepared. A higher level of education and a
1Ibid
., pp. 13-^7.
2 Ibid., pp. 121-124.
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wider range of new job skills are, to him, the only real elements
that will help ensure that the black population is to achieve
full participation in the open society. He further stresses
that although there should be some striving for increased black
business development, the events of history have not given the
black community enough economic intelligence and business acumen
to cope successfully with the complexities of modern business.
He warns his people not to be led astray by what appear to be
exciting and dynamic schemes to enhance economic development,
and that once the "... fallacy of 'black capitalism' withers
away, the emerging opportunities for genuine participation in
business can be seen more clearly."
In essence, then, Brimmer's position is that blacks
should not be led into the trap of creating more "Mom and Pop"
type enterprises, which typifies the current black business,
since these businesses will not make black capitalists out of
anyone, nor will they aid the black communities. Rather the
black people should concentrate on strengthening their existing
businesses and increasing their employment levels, job skills
and economic intelligence, which in turn will set the stage for
the eventual development of larger, more profitable black
businesses
.
At the other end of the spectrum there are those like
Dunbar S. McLaurin, a former professor of economics at several
Andrew F. Brimmer, "Economic Agenda for Black
Americans," Black Business Digest
,
I (March, 1971), 36
2 Ibid., pp. 35-39.
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colleges and now president of GHETTONOMICS, INC., a Harlem-
based firm of ghetto economic consultants, who contends that
"Brimmerism . . . is a desparate game of economic genocide for
blacks . . . (which) advocates bringing Black Americans to the
verge of full economic equality, but stopping just short of it."
McLaurin sees that this line of reasoning will never give blacks
the opportunity to actually own any part of the economic system
in which they will only be allowed to work, regardless of whether
this level of employment is more enlightening than it is now.
The net result of Brimmer's approach will be to permanently
relegate the black people to the role of "Marginal Americans."
Samuel C. Thompson, a 27 year old MBA graduate of
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and also a
graduate of Pennsylvania's lav/ school, while also critical of
Brimmer's total denouncement of the concept of black capitalism,
believes that these thoughts should be put into proper per-
spective. To him Brimmer is correct to the extent that he
believes the current thrust toward increased black ownership
will only lead to the emergence of more "Mom and Pop" stores
located solely in the ghetto areas, since the marginal business
enterprise has little chance of success regardless of the color
of the proprietor. But as Thompson sees it, like it or not,
the "ownership bug is biting and aspirations are growing." He
feels that the real meaning in Brimmer's message is not that
blacks should avoid developing businesses, but that they should
Dunbar S. McLaurin, "White Brimmerism or Black Capital-
ism," Black Business Digest, I (March, 1971), 4 3.
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place more emphasis on developing larger and more productive
enterprises that will be viable to markets that extend beyond
the boundaries of the ghetto.
Abraham S. Venable, former Director of the Commerce
Department's Office of Minority Business Enterprise and currently
Director of Urban Affairs at General Motors, probably puts the
whole issue in the best perspective in his contention that the
debate over the merits of black business development has been
going on since at least 1900, when Booker T. Washington formed
the National Negro Business League to develop a plan to assist
blacks to participate more fully in the country's business life.
As Venable has stated it:
The similarities in the conditions facing blacks then
and now are striking and pitiful. Blacks in 1900 were
debating the same issues we are debating today. Do we
amass political power or economic power? Do we work to-
ward a fully integrated society or for a parallel, black-
owned and managed society? Do we keep on trying or do
we give up and revolt? The pitiful part is that black
ownership, still the victim of endless talk and discus-
sion, has not advanced significantly .
2
He believes that the time for philosophical debate is over and
that employment programs alone, without ownership of some kind,
are not enough since "Negroes had full employment on the plan-
3tation where our problems were the greatest."
Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., "Black Ownership An Analysis
and a Proposal - Part I," Black Business Digest , II (November,
1971), 46.
pAbraham S. Venable, "Black Business Development: Chaos






The Capital Gap In the Black Community
It would appear that the debate over the merits of black
business development may never be fully resolved to the satis-
faction of all concerned since the business versus employment
issue is somewhat analogous to the age old question concerning
the chicken and the egg. In more pragmatic terms, there is a
black business community that is functioning although somewhat
marginally and precariously, and many blacks are firmly committed
to the belief that total equality is directly linked to the
future success of black business development.
If this commitment is so earnest, the question must be
raised next as to why the black community cannot lift itself
up by its own bootstraps as have other one-time American
minority groups such as the Irish, the Italians and the Jews
.
The reasons are many and include among others the obvious
issue of discrimination, the lack of a business heritage brought
over from the "old country," the barriers toward developing a
political power base and the inability to accumulate wealth.
Although all of these reasons are interrelated and of equal
importance, for the purposes of this chapter only the issue of
accumulated wealth, or a community capital base, will be
analyzed
.
There appear to be two primary reasons why black com-
munities cannot accumulate sufficient capital to build more
viable businesses on their own. First is the wealth gap asso-
ciated with the income patterns of black workers. Second is
the makeup of the ghetto business community itself. With
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respect to the income patterns, Venable put it well when he
said
:
It is one of the more cruel ironies of the black
experience in the United States that in 1789 when the
Constitution was ratified the Negro was counted as
three-fifths of a man for the purposes of representa-
tion and taxation. But today, 180 years later, the
Negro is now counted as a whole man for the purposes
of representation and taxation, but he earns only
three-fifths as much as his white counterpart.!
This means simply that for every $100 a white man earns a black
earns only about $60 for equivalent work. Add to this the esti-
mation that in some ghetto areas black unemployment runs as high
as 25 to 30 percent and the lack of an equitable accumulated
gross income flowing into black communities would lead to the
2
obvious conclusion that an income deficit does exist.
More definitive than this, though, were the results of
a 1967 study done by the Office of Economic Opportunity, which
studied the size, composition and concentration of net wealth
accumulated by black families as compared to white families.
This study revealed that the disparity in net wealth, in holdings
of land, property, securities and other such investments, is far
greater than the current 40 percent net income spread, due to
the legacy of past economic inequities in income distribution.
It was further observed that current consumption studies show









level. In conclusion, it was felt that even with the current
trend toward a lesser income imbalance between races and the
higher propensity to save, the black community can never hope
2
to overcome this inherited wealth gap.
Although the wealth gap itself might never be overcome,
the fact that the income gap is closing should present some
degree of optimism. Yet this optimism is soon shattered when one
examines the flow of income within the black ghettos themselves.
In 1967, the District of Columbia had a black population of
nearly 70 percent, but a black business population of only about
7 percent. Estimates of gross sales of these businesses were
between $20 - $40 million. Estimates of the sales of all com-
mercial establishments were about $4.8 billion. Thus the 7
percent black businesses accounted for at most only 1 percent of
3
all sales. The conclusion is that the black community acts
merely as a conduit through which money flows in from the white
community in the form of wages to the black workers and back out
to the white community in the form of payment for goods and
services purchased in the ghetto from white merchants. As Ali
Fatemi has stated, "It is obvious that such a short income
Henry S. Terrell, "V/ealth Accumulation of Black and
White Families: The Empirical Evidence," Journal of Finance
,
XXVI (May, 19 71), 363.
2 Ibid
., 373.
3Mayor's Economic Development Committee, Report of the
Committee, Overall Economic Development Program for Washington,
D. C
.
(unpublished study, Washington, D. C
.
, December, 1970 )
,
p. VII - 1.
l\




cycle prevents accumulation of any savings as a prerequisite to
investment
.
In addition to the above findings is the fact that the
cost of living can be much higher in the black communities than
it is in other areas. In Chicago, blacks are reported to pay
close to $30 a month more for housing than do whites who reside
2in comparable areas. Oranges cost up to 15 percent more in
East Harlem than in Manhattan markets just fifteen blocks away.
There are reasons for this, of course, and the prime one is
the high incidence of crime in the ghettos. A recent study
by the Small Business Administration found that the 4 percent of
all businesses which are located in the ghettos accounted for
2 percent of all sales but 8 percent of all dollars lost as a
4
result of crime.
The net result of this data leads to a partial defini-
tion of our problem. There is an established income and spending
cycle in the ghetto that defies breaking by the black community
itself. There is little discretionary income left in the
ghettos that can be channeled into savings. This means that
All Fatemi, "Black Capitalism as a Strategy for Economic
Development of the Ghetto," University of Akron Business Review
(Pall 1970), 47-^8.
2Thompson, "Black Ownership An Analysis and a Proposal -
Part I," 30.
Theodore L. Cross, Black Capitalism: Strategy for
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blacks themselves cannot provide the risk capital necessary to
stimulate business development. As Fred C. Allvine has stated,
"These conditions cause a 'business capital trap' that has and
will continue to seriously constrain black business development
unless creative programs can be found to significantly increase
the capital flow into the ghetto. „1
Fred C. Allvine, "Black Business Development,"
Journal of Marketing . XXXIV (April, 1970), 6.

CHAPTER III
THE BANKING INDUSTRY'S RESPONSIVENESS
TO THE NEEDS OF BLACK BUSINESS
Introduction
With a fairly substantial case having been made by the
preponderance of black leaders for increasing the development of
black businesses coupled with the inherent capital gap existing
in the black community, it is necessary next to assess the per-
formance of the traditional, private financial institutions in
meeting the financial needs of black businessmen. There are two
necessary reasons for making the assessment. First, in a free-
enterprise system, modern economic theory believes that Federal
intervention should only be taken when the normal market mech-
anisms fail to allow for the free and equitable entry of
producers and consumers into the economic mainstream. Second,
even if Federal assistance is required to assist minority
businessmen in gaining the initial viability to enter the main-
stream of the competitive marketplace, to maintain viability
and growth in the long run these businessmen must be able to
rely on the commercial financial windows for financial assistance
on a equitable basis.
This chapter will first look at the current status and




attuned to the needs of black businessmen. Then an assessment
will be made of the majority banking industry's performance with
respect to serving the needs of black businessmen. Next an
example of one bank's program of special commitment to minority
businesses will be presented as a potential model. Finally,
three new programs undertaken by the banking industry to assist
both black bankers and black businessmen will be reviewed.
Analysis of the Black Banking Industry
The history and development of the black banking industry
closely parallels that of black businesses in general. Contrary
to popular belief, the Freedman's Bank, which was created at the
end of the Civil War to hold approximately $200,000 in unclaimed
savings of black soldiers, was not a black bank at all. Al-
though holding only deposits of black people, it was run by
white trustees who were not even stockholders in the bank. The
bank did prosper until 1870, when Jay Cooke's Northern Pacific
bond venture failed causing a general banking panic. Within
eighteen months, Freedman's lost over $2 million in deposits and
was forced to cease operations.
The first truly black-owned bank was the Savings Bank
of the Grand Fountain, United Order, True Reformers, chartered
in 1888. From that year until 1933, there were 13^ financial
institutions created by blacks and forty could be classified as
2
commercial banks. The average life span of these institutions
lu Banking," Black Enterprise
,
II (October, 1971), 31.
2Edward D. Irons, "Black Banking - Problems and
Prospects," Black Business Digest, II (December, 1971), ^2.
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was about nine years. Although this track record was probably
not too different from the total banking community, which lost
nearly 1^,000 banks during this period, there were only eight
black banks which were able to reopen their doors after President
Franklin Roosevelt's three-day banking moratorium in April of
1933.
From April of 1933 until 19^7, only four new black banks
were organized. Since 19^7, however, the number of black banks
has more than doubled. By October of 1971, there were twenty-
six black-owned banks in operation and seven more are tentatively
scheduled to open within the year. Unlike the older banks, which
were located primarily in the South, the majority of the newer
2
ones are being opened in the North and the West.
Andrew F. Brimmer, in his capacity as a governor of the
Federal Reserve Board, has had a comprehensive analysis made of
the twenty-two black banks that were in existence as of late
1969. Using the Consolidated Report of Conditions and Examina-
tion Reports for all member banks, he had the Fed's examination
staff make a detailed comparison of black-owned banks to all
1.
insured commercial banks. As Table 2 shows, black banks
comprise only .16 percent of all banks and their total assets
are only .0^9 percent. With total deposits averaging $10
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BLACK BANKS' SHARE OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1969
(Amounts: All Banks, Billions of Dollars;
Black Banks, Millions of Dollars)
All Insured
Commercial
Category Banks Black Banks
Percent
Amount of Total
Number of banks 13,^73 22 0.163
Number of employees 904,736 834 0.092
Average per bank 67.1 41.7 62.2
Total assets $530.7 $258.8 0.049
Total deposits 437.0 229.5 0.053
Average size of bank
($ millions) 32.6 10.4 31.9
Total capital 39.6 19.2 0.048
Total loans 286.8 130.4 0.045
Commercial and industrial 108.4 36.2 0.033
Real estate 70.3 46.9 0.067





Population (millions) 203.2 22.7 11.2
Labor force (millions) 77.9 9.1 11.7
Aggregate money income
($ billions)
Ownerships of selected assets



















Source: "The Black Banks
Prospects," 38l.
An Assessment of Performance and
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typical bank in the country at large. The figures also show
that blacks owned only about 1.1 percent of the total deposits
in all financial institutions. A further analysis reveals that
black banks control only .0^8 percent of the total capital of
all banks. From this it can be implied that the black banks
themselves have a pronounced capital gap.
Brimmer's examiners made other comparisons of the profit-
ability of black banks, which indicated to him that by operating
in the ghetto areas, black banks are working at a distinct dis-
advantage. For example, in 1968, operating costs absorbed 93
percent of operating income of black banks compared to an average
of 78 percent for all member banks. Wages accounted for nearly
one-third of these operating costs compared to only one-quarter
for the typical banks. Brimmer feels that one of the big
reasons why labor and total operating costs are higher for black
banks is the larger number of smaller accounts that they must
service. Due to these higher operating costs, black banks could
pay at that time only an average of 3.1 percent on time and
savings accounts compared to H.^ percent by the typical bank.
As to overall efficiency, Table 3 shows the trend between
1967 and 1970 in the areas of asset evaluation and an overall
composite rating. With regard to the Composite Rating, a mark
in Group Rating Class 1 implies that a bank was strong in all
three areas of capital adequacy, asset quality and management







ASSET EVALUATION AND COMPOSITE RATING OF BLACK BANKS,
AND A SAMPLE OF FEDERAL RESERVE STATE MEMBER BANKS,
1967, 1968, AND 1970

















































Asset Rating A B C D
F.R. Member
Sample (196 7)
Number 677 536 106 25 10
Percent 100.0 79.5 15.7 3-7 1.1
Black Banks
19 67 Number 15 5 6 3 1
Percent 100.0 33.3 40.0 20.0 6.7
1968 Number 15 7 3 4 1
Percent 100.0 46.6 20.0 26.7 6.7
1970 Number 22 12 4 6
Percent 100.0 54.4 18.
2
27.4 0.0




that a bank might be strong in two of the three areas but weak
in the third area. As can be seen, black banks as a whole are
improving with respect to both the Composite Rating, with an
increase of 3^.4 percent in the four years, and the Asset Rating,
with an increase of 21.1 percent. Still, although these figures
appear optimistic, Brimmer cites other figures that tend to
dampen this optimistic trend.
Black banks are on the average setting aside 7.3 percent
of operating expenses as a provision for loan losses whereas the
typical bank requires only a 2.1 percent loss reserve. Brimmer
believes that this is directly related to the high risks of doing
business in the ghetto with high unemployment, low family income
and high business failure rates. He also cites as internal
factors, which lessen the performance of black banks, the lack
of adequate capital, poor asset quality and an insufficient
managerial expertise of black bankers themselves.
In a more detailed breakdown of the Composite Rating,
an analysis of management performance revealed that the per-
centage of black banks receiving a poor rating in this area
increased from 20 percent in 1967 to 43 percent in 1970.
Brimmer believes that due to the handicaps indicated
above, black banks promise little potential for being viable
financial instruments in the commercial development of the
ghetto. Most black banks do not concentrate their loans in the
ghetto, and he feels they are wise not to do so. In the area
1 Ibid., p. 392.
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of financing black businesses, he found that commercial and
industrial loans comprised only 8.9 percent of the investment
portfolio of the average black bank compared to a 22.2 percent
rate for the typical bank. Loan to deposit ratios in general
are 17 percent lower for black banks than for the typical
member bank. As Table 4 shows, black banks on the average made
78.2 percent of their loans to local borrowers, but this
accounted for only ^
. 7 percent of total assets.
In summarizing his findings, Brimmer is strongly con-
vinced that the proliferation of more black banks in the belief
that they can make a large contribution to the financing for
economic development in the ghetto areas is something that
should not be encouraged, since by all indications they cannot
fulfill this goal. He further believes that if the founding of
more black banks will be a stimulus to racial pride, then the
motive is fine, "But under those circumstances, most of the black
banks might be viewed primarily as ornaments -- that is, as a
mark of distinction or a badge of honor which provides a visible
2
symbol of accomplishment."
Brimmer's unfortunate choice of words in summarizing his
analysis of black banks has probably brought more wrath upon
him by black business leaders than if he had announced that he
personally was going to lead a draft to nominate Lester Maddox









SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF LOANS OUTSTANDING AT BLACK
BANKS AS SHOWN IN EXAMINATION REPORTS, 1970
(Accounts in Thousands of Dollars; Deposit Size
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it did from the most prominent and potentially influential
black banker in the country, the one black man who could do more
to help the black banking community than any other, many black
business leaders feel that Brimmer has seriously and possibly
irreparably shattered the slight degree of confidence that was
beginning to emerge in this new fledgling industry.
Among the more prominent critics of Brimmer's assessment
have been Samuel R. Pierce, General Counsel, U.S. Treasury
Department; Dunbar S. McLaurin, economist, educator and president
of a firm of ghetto economic consultants; and Edward D. Irons,
former professor at Howard University and Executive Director of
the National Bankers Association, and currently filling the Mills
R. Lane Chair in Banking and Finance at Atlanta University.
Pierce's main argument with Brimmer's analysis is that
it compared black banks to all banks only with respect to size
but not age. He believes this is an unfair comparison since most
of the black banks are newly chartered and are bound to have a
less efficient performance record during their first few years
of operation. For example, new banks usually cannot invest their
funds in loans as rapidly as deposits are created and this
accounts for the higher reliance on investments in Government
securities or participation with other banks in carrying loans
outside of their own normal marketing area. As they stabilize
their financial structure and gain more maturity in managing
their total portfolios, Pierce feels these black banks will turn
more toward their own normal markets for the heaviest investments
in lending. He feels that regardless of their current
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comparative ratings, Brimmer has underestimated the influence
these banks are making in the ghettos since they are providing
loans to black businessmen that were not being provided by
white-owned banks. Finally, he feels that the emergence of
black banks has caused some white-owned banks to be more liberal
in their lending policies to black businessmen.
McLaurin feels that if Brimmer is going to compare the
performance of black-owned banks to white-owned banks then he
should do just that. By this he means that the white-owned
banks selected should be of the same size, age and operating
environment, e.g., the operating environment should mean the
same cities in which black-owned banks are located and the same
type of neighborhood business. McLaurin chides Brimmer for
stating that "Blacks must accept tokenism in banking and
finance." He feels that we need not only to strengthen current
black banks, but that a massive program to create "instant
banking" must be started so that there are at least 150 black
2banks in operation at the end of the next five years.
Irons does not criticize Brimmer by name but in his
defense of the black banking industry, he does address himself
to most of Brimmer's criticisms. He feels that to properly
assess black banks one must first remember that these banks
represent a new, emerging industry and as such they are facing
the same problems that are common to any new industry. To him,
1Samuel R. Pierce, Jr., "Black Banks CAN Be Vital
Instruments," Banking, LXII (March, 1971), 33, 85.
McLaurin, "White Brimmerism or Black Capitalism," 44.
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there is no real reason why we need black banks, per se, but
until the general banking industry can, or will, respond ade-
quately to the needs of the black community, black banks provide
one of the only viable means to help satisfy the capital needs
of black businesses . He acknowledges the fact that black banks
are located in the lowest income areas, which hinders their
growth, and that black bankers at present do not have an adequate
degree of managerial experience. But he argues that unless we
have a black banking industry, there will not be a place for
future black banks to really learn their trade.
There are some who would argue this point with Irons
stating that the majority business community is engaged in an
intensified effort to train and place black people in higher
levels of responsibility within the majority banks. Yet it
was not until 1972 that a black man was chosen to serve in a
top management position in a white-owned bank in the District
of Columbia. On January 11, 1972, the National Bank of
Washington, the city's third largest bank, announced that
Emmett J. Rice had been named as senior vice president for
planning and development. Rice, who holds a doctorate in
economics from the University of California at Berkeley, was
deputy U.S. executive director at the World Bank, has held a
variety of international financial agency positions and is
executive director of the Mayor's Economic Development Committee




(MEDCO) in the District of Columbia. He would appear to be
qualified for his new position.
Irons sums up the prospects of black banks in two words,
"societal contingency." He feels that black banks, "are a mirror
of contemporary American society, in the same manner as black
doctors, black lawyers, black businessmen or black economists."
He feels that they all are a product of their heritage, and face
the same past inequities and present deterrents to viability. All
possess the same potential for future prosperity and black banks
can become a sound financial industry. But to achieve this po-
tential they must be freely allowed to grow and develop. Further,
Federal, state and local governments must begin to use black banks
as a depository in the same manner as they use other banks.
Finally, black banks need additional venture capital and greater
managerial development programs so that they can become competi-
2tive in the mainstream of the nation's financial community.
Majority Banking Assistance to Black Business
It is generally conceded by the majority banking com-
munity itself that it has not been overly responsive to the
financial needs of minority entrepreneurs . Much of the reason
for this is due to the traditionally conservative nature of the
industry with regard to the factor of risk, but an element of
discrimination has been present as well. For example, it is
lMRice Named To High Post With NBW," The Washington
Post , Jan. 11, 1972, sec. D., p. 6.





reported that in order for John H. Johnson, who owns Ebony and
Jet magazines as well as other successful enterprises, to obtain
a $500 business loan he had to tell a bank's lending officer that
the money was to be used to finance a vacation.
Although this is an extreme case in point, and has not
been authenticated by this writer, it does indicate the type of
frustration potentially successful black businessmen have had in
dealing with white-owned banks. Statistics gathered in the
District of Columbia in 1967 revealed that the best estimate of
the total number of direct commercial loans (direct implying that
there was no use of a Federal guarantee such as can be provided by
the Small Business Administration) which were made to minority
businessmen totaled between $150,000 to $200,000. V/hen com-
pared to the nearly $3^5 million in loans made to white business-
men during that same year, the white businessmen received 1,725
2times more money than did the black businessmen.
While statistics of this nature sound extremely impres-
sive, they really say very little more than the fact that whites
got a lot more money than blacks in business loans. It would
really be significant to know how many black businessmen were
turned down for a business loan when they presented as sound a
financial plan to a white bank's lending officer as a white
businessman who was granted a loan. Unfortunately, such data
has not been made available, or at least not to the public, by
Thompson, "Black Ownership An Analysis and a Proposal -
Part I," 32.
Mayor's Economic Development Committee, Overall Economi c
Development Program for Washington, D.C., p. VII-2.
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the banking industry. Even if this data were available the story
would still be incomplete since many black businessmen, or
potential businessmen, have so little confidence in the concern
of the majority banking industry for the future of black business
development that they never even bother to approach a bank for
financial assistance. Despite this lack of total information
by which the true financial needs of all black businessmen can
be measured more accurately, there is enough data available to
substantiate the belief that black businessmen cannot get the
financial assistance they need from the majority-owned banking
industry
.
A study by the Office of Planning, Research and Analysis
of the Small Business Administration (SBA) in 1968 revealed that
in order to reach equality, in terms of having the same percent-
age of business enterprises in proportion to their percentage of
the country's total population, minority groups need 600,000
total enterprises which would require in excess of $40 billion
in equity financing. Although these figures can easily be mis-
leading, since they assume that there are 300,000 well-qualified
potential entrepreneurs just waiting in the wings for a source
of initial seed-capital, an SBA survey of black households in
thirty-three cities did reveal that 58 percent of the people
had considered going into business for themselves but 72 percent
cited a lack of financing as their principle deterrent. Of the
Alfred L. Morris, "The Problem of Risk Capital in Ghetto
Areas," Black Business Digest , I (May, 197D, ^2.
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total sample, 44 percent had incomes of over $15,000 and 46
percent had from one to three years of college
.
SBA also made a study of the degree of participation the
banking community has made with respect to investments in minority
enterprises using the SBA loan guarantee program. This program
provides upwards of a 90 percent Federal guarantee on all business
loans made to minority businesses. A loan participation index
was devised so that a banking district would receive a rating of
100 if its share of all loans to minority persons was the same
percentage as the minority population of that district. Table 5
shows the results of the ratings for fiscal year 1970. As might
be expected, those districts that had the highest minority popu-
lations as a percentage of total population tended to show a
lower density index than those districts with smaller minority
populations. Table 6 shows the growth rate of participation by
district between fiscal year 1969 and fiscal year 1970. Although
the data do not provide any clear cut indicators as to the future
trends in minority lending, they do show that certain areas,




The main reason the majority banking community has not
been responsive to the needs of minority entrepreneurs can be
summed up in one word -- tradition. Tradition dictates that
bankers will be conservative risk takers and not speculators
.
Garvin, "The Small Business Capital Gap: The Special
Case of Minority Enterprise," 448-450.
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To a degree this Is as it should be since the country can ill
afford a financial crisis like the one that occurred during the
Great Depression. Since 1933, the nation's banks have been
looked upon as the cornerstones of our financial stability and
have tried to maintain a posture of underlying conservatism,
relying primarily on the Federal Reserve Board and the U.S.
Treasury for their overall source of financial policy. The
Federal Reserve Board itself has resisted attempts to enter into
the picture of possibly creating secondary markets for the inter-
mediate and long-term paper of small business concerns . In a
report on this subject, the Fed concluded that:
A possible type of credit accommodation not provided
for in the redesigned window is long-term credit to meet
the needs of banks serving perennial credit-deficient
areas or sectors . . . the solution to this problem does
not properly lie within the scope of discount-window
operations . . . More direct and fundamental answers to
the credit-deficit problem are believed to lie in the
improvement of secondary markets for bank assets and
liabi li ties .
1
When one attempts to apply the traditional techniques
for analyzing credit risk to a normal black business loan, the
outcome seldom results in favor of the businessman. These
traditional techniques are based on an established set of
criteria, which includes:
. . . the competence and character of management;
potential for stability or growth of earnings; growth
in sales; quality of assets; comparative operating






personal equity in initial capitalization; and the
amount and quality of market competition.!
The black businessman operating in the ghetto can seldom measure
up to the degree required in each of these criteria to obtain a
business loan.
Don H. Alexander, a lending officer at the Seattle First
National Bank and former member of the American Bankers Asso-
ciation's Urban Affairs Task Force on Minority Lending, has de-
fined six problem areas which have tended to prohibit banks from
helping to fill the black capital gap. First is the lack of
communication between middle and top management within the bank.
The bank president may publicly announce increasing support to
minority enterprise but the word never filters down to the lending
officers in the form of revised and liberalized policies. Second
is the bank's reluctance to look at the potential minority entre-
preneur in other than the traditional manner. Bankers have
failed to realize that black businessmen operate in a different
environment and with an inferior business experience level than
their white counterparts . Third, Alexander feels that most banks
are still out of tune with the times and unaware of the magnitude
of the problems in the ghettos. Fourth, bank examiners themselves
may tend to override a banker's desire to assist minority loan-
seekers by highly restrictive portfolio evaluation standards.
Fifth is the fear many bankers have of the negative reaction
they will receive from their own shareholders if they become
Peter F. McNeish, "Where Does the Money Come From?",
Chapter 7 of Black Economic Development , ed. by W. F. Haddad and
G. D. Pugh, The American Assembly (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 86.
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involved in ghetto financing. Finally is the inherent communi-
cations gap that exists between the banks and the residents of
the ghetto. Although a bank may publicly announce a new policy
making it easier for blacks to obtain loans, the words will go
unheard by the masses unless it is relayed to them by a member of
the black community.
First Pennsylvania's Minority Lending Program
Although the above argument holds true for the vast
majority of banks, there are certain individual banks that have
broken, or at least bent, the yoke of tradition and demonstrated
their belief that a bank cannot be considered successful unless
it does become socially as well as financially involved in its
community. One of the leaders of this new movement is the First
Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Company.
The main advocate of this new approach in banking
philosophy is First Pennsylvania's president, John Bunting.
Bunting feels that real social involvement of some degree should
be a part of every corporation's day-to-day operations if it can
possibly afford to do so. He states that this involvement
usually implies funds, and the most obvious deterrent to the use
of company profits is that by so doing, the corporation will be
guilty of not maximizing the profitability of the firm to its
owners. While he acknowledges that this is an important and
obvious consideration, he believes that on the whole, shareholders
Don H. Alexander, "A Black Banker Speaks Out," Black
Business Digest, I (March, 19 71), 45-46.
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will not condemn management for pursuing such a policy. In fact
he feels that just the opposite will occur, since if properly
informed of the reasons for such involvement, shareholders will
applaude management and take personal pride in their company's
social achievements. Of course this is all predicated on the
fact that the company's overall profitability is gaining well.
The program began in June of 1966 when a group of black
businessmen approached the bank with an earnest request that the
bank make more loans available to black businesses. The bank
responded by setting up a separate office for reviewing black loan
requests and assigned one of its best commercial loan officers
to this office. In addition to this the policy was established
that a potential loan could not be rejected without going through
2
senior management. So we can see at this point that First
Pennsylvania had overcome most of the problems Alexander found
that banks must resolve before they can deal realistically with
black business loans; that is, top management support and clear-
cut lending policies.
From 1966 to mid-1971, First Pennsylvania had made over
350 loans in excess of $7.6 million and has experienced a net
loss rate during this period of 7 percent, far less than it had
anticipated. Since its first involvement in 1966, First
Pennsylvania has established a Metropolitan Economic Development
John Bunting, "Banking," Black Business Digest , II
(December, 1971), 30.
^Elmer Young, Jr., "Measuring a Commitment," Black
Business Digest , II (January, 1972), 48.
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Unit within the bank which now coordinates black business loans
for all branch banks and performs a vital function of counseling
all rejected loan applicants as to where the weaknesses are in
their plans and how an applicant can best overcome them. The
bank also has a Business Experience Education Program that
acquaints high school students with the banking industry and
provides part-time employment for them. The total program has
been considered a financial as well as a social success
.
With the economic problems that have plagued most business
firms during the last few years, and especially the last half of
1971, Bunting's call for more social involvement will still fall
mainly on deaf ears in spite of the resounding success of his
bank's program. But there are signs that corporations and their
owners are beginning to recognize that a corporation's goals and
objectives must include more than the profit motive. First
Pennsylvania's success in their program of assisting minority
enterprises certainly bears consideration as a possible model
for other institutions to study.
New Banking Programs to Assist
Black Bankers and Businessmen
Although the banking industry may not be responding
as quickly to the needs of black businessmen as some would wish,
there have been some significant recent developments that should
help to strengthen black banks as well as provide more direct
assistance to minority businessmen. One of the leading
1Ibid., p. 49.

organizations in stimulating greater banking commitments has
been the American Bankers Association's (ABA) through its Urban
Affairs Committee
.
The Urban Affairs Committee was established in 1968, "to
initiate and coordinate the banking industry's program to help
solve urban problems." The Committee is composed of sixty senior
executives of banks serving large metropolitan areas in the
country, and is chaired by Thomas W. McMahon, Jr., executive vice
president of The Chase Manhattan Bank. Two of the more viable
programs the Committee has undertaken are the formation of the
Minbanc Capital Corporation (MINBANC) and the Billion Dollar
Goal. 1
MINBANC is a non-diversified, closed-end investment
company, incorporated in Delaware on June 18, 1971, whose goal it
is to be able to supply $10 million in equity capital to viable
minority-controlled banks. MINBANC 's stock eventually will be
offered to nearly all of the 1*1,000 members of the ABA. The
reason for MINBANC is the results of a detailed study of twenty-
three minority-owned banks in comparison with the typical member
bank of similar size, in terms of total deposits. The study
showed that minority banks are nearly twice as highly leveraged,
in terms of total liabilities to liquid capital base, as the
typical member bank. This dangerously high leverage ratio of
1




29.7 to 1 clearly indicated that minority banks have a serious
capital shortage
.
Minority banks will have to have been in operation for at
least three years before obtaining MINBANC assistance, since the
ABA wants to be sure that these banks have achieved some viability
on their own. Capital funds will be made available both directly,
through buying investment securities of the minority banks, and
indirectly through investments in other sources which will cause
funds to flow to the minority banks . Ordinarily MINBANC will
not acquire any voting securities in the minority banks. MINBANC
itself will receive certain administrative services from the ABA.
Shares in MINBANC will sell for $500 each and no purchases may
2
own more than 5 percent of the total shares outstanding.
Since MINBANC is just beginning to make initial offerings,
no information is available to indicate when, or if, it will be
fully capitalized at its goal of $10 million. Although this sum
is by no means a large sum, still it represents a beginning of a
change in attitude that white bankers are taking toward their
black counterparts
.
Another program to assist minority owned banks is
President Nixon's $100 million Minority Bank Deposit Program,
begun on October 2, 1970. Initiated by the Department of the
lr
rhomas W. McMahon, Jr., "Minority Banks," Black
Enterprise
,
II (October, 1971), 3^.
2
"The Minbanc Capital Corp. $10 Million to Minority
Owned Banks," Black Business Digest , II (December, 197D, 39-^0.
-"'New Funds Benefiting Inner City Institutions," Commerce
Today , II (November 15, 197D, 9-10.
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Treasury and the Department of Commerce, with the assistance of
the National Bankers Association, the program was designed with a
goal of $35 million new deposits in minority banks by Federal
agencies and $65 million from the private sector within one year.
On September 30, 1971, the nation's 35 minority-owned banks re-
ported an increase in deposits of $155.5 million during the year.
Total combined deposits of these banks now equals $552 million,
nearly a ^0 percent increase over the $396.5 million figure
reported a year ago. More than $100 million of these deposits
has been directly attributed to this program.
The other ABA program, called the Billion Dollar Goal, is
designed to have commercial banks commit at least $1 billion in
new financial assistance to minority businessmen during the in-
clusive five year period of 1971 to 1975. The goal was derived
from a 1970 survey of 188 banks, made by the Urban Affairs
Committee, as to their future plans for assisting minority
businesses. The survey revealed that 8l percent of the respon-
dents are already planning increased minority lending programs,
especially of the soft loan variety. During the year ending
June 30, 1969, about one-half of these banks had made loans
totaling nearly $100 million to over 21,000 minority businessmen.
Based on this record, the Urban Affairs Committee doubled this
amount and extended it for five years to achieve the $1 billion
figure. Considering that the number of banks surveyed represented
only about 1 percent of the total banking community, this figure
1
"Nixon's $100 Million Goal For Minority Banks Exceeded,"
Black Business Digest , II (January, 1972), ^7.
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is actually somewhat conservative. The ABA intended it to be
so, since it recognizes that past "overpromises " to minority
groups has only led to increased levels of frustration.
To stimulate local banking action to meet this goal, the
Urban Affairs Committee has chosen to focus on 50 key cities
which represent those areas of highest concentration of minority
businessmen. Seminars will be held with local bankers in each
of these cities to not only encourage participation in this pro-
gram but also, hopefully, to encourage local bankers to develop
local urban affairs committees to bring increased attention
to the needs for a coordinated banking effort in all areas of
urban development.
None of the above programs can provide the total funding
the minority businessmen feel they can now use, yet there is a
significant change in attitudes prevalent in the intent and
direction of these programs that did not exist even five years
ago. The best estimates of an ABA survey made in 1971 on bank
lending performance of 1970 indicate that approximately $160
million business loans were made to minority businessmen in 1970,
Although the total amount may or may not be significant, the
data from which it was derived shows that the rate of lending
increased 17 percent between the first six months and the second
six months, which does indicate a significant and encouraging
trend.
lnBanking Industry Plans $1 Billion in Loans to Minority
Businesses by 1975," Black Business Digest , II (December, 1971),
3 1*, 38.
2




FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO MINORITY BUSINESS
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to review the growth and
development of Federal financial assistance programs to minority
enterprises and to describe how the major lending programs oper-
ate. Since the Small Business Administration (SBA) has provided
the primary financial assistance to minority enterprises, this
chapter will first discuss the evolution of the SBA assistance
programs up to 1968. Next the full emergence of minority enter-
prise assistance from 19 6 8 to the present will be reviewed.
Then the mechanics of SBA's principal loan programs will be
outlined. Finally, a brief assessment of the performance of these
programs will be made.
SBA Minority Business Assistance Prior to 1968
The SBA was created in 1953, in an attempt to combine
the activites of two other Federal agencies, the Small Defense
Plants Administration (SDBA) and the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation (RFC), into a single, integrated agency. The
function of the SDPA was to assist small but strategic former
defense businesses in the successful transformation from
defense-oriented to consumer-oriented product lines. The




business concerns as well as to assist victims of floods and
other disasters
.
The SBA was given the functions of these two agencies
plus a more extensive scope of operations than its predecessors.
In establishing SBA, the law stated:
It is declared policy of the Congress that the
Government should aid, counsel, assist, and protect
insofar as possible the interests of small business
concerns in order to preserve free competitive enter-
prise, to insure that a fair proportion of the total
purchases and contracts for supplies and services for
the Government be placed with small business enter-
prises, and to maintain and strengthen the overall
economy of the Nation.
2
So in effect the Congress established this new agency to be the
chief Federal advocate for all small businessmen, and in a
stronger capacity than either of its predecessors had enjoyed.
The actual definition of a small business with respect
to size can be relatively complex and is not considered relevant
to this study. However, when SBA was created in 1953 3 it was
estimated that nearly 96 percent of the over 4 million total
businesses in existence throughout the nation at that time were
3defined as being "small" and eligible for SBA assistance.
Although its charter clearly gave SBA the opportunity
to assist minority businesses, in its early years little effort
was made in this direction. No criticism of the SBA is intended
by this comment; it just reflects the tempo of the times during
U.S. Small Business Administration, 1st Semi-Annual
Report
, 1953 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 195*0 ,
p. 1.
2Small Business Act , PL 163, sec. 215 (1953).
^U.S. Small Business Administration, 1st Semi-Annual
Report




the late 1950's and early 1960's. The fact is that SBA was
having a difficult time trying to help white small businessmen
achieve a greater degree of viability. By 1964, however, the
civil rights issue began to receive much more political interest
and with the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, a new
social and political commitment was made to our minority citizens
by the Federal government. While this act was not economically
oriented, its companion bill, the Economic Opportunity Act of
1964, made a firm Federal financial commitment, which eventually
was applied to minority businesses. Title IV of the Act states:
It is the purpose of this title to assist in the
establishment, preservation, and strengthening of small
business concerns and improve the managerial skills
employed in such enterprises, with special attention to
small business concerns (1) located in urban or rural
areas with high proportions of unemployed or low-income
individuals, or (2) owned by low-income individuals;
and to mobilize for these objectives private as well as
public managerial skills and resources.
2
Even though a mechanism had been established by this
legislation to give some Federal financial assistance to minority
businessmen, no real attempt was made to use it for this purpose
until 1966. One SBA official, who worked in this program during
this early period, said that the Economic Opportunity Loan
Program (EOL) really did not provide much assistance at the
start because the Office of Economic Opportunity's (0E0) main
emphasis was on solving the unemployment issue and not minority
John Moore, private interview at U.S. Small Business
Administration, Washington, D.C., November, 1971.
Economic Opportunity Act
,
U.S. Code, Vol. XLII, Sec.
2901 et. seq. Tl964).
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businessmen's problems. Loan money, which was provided in
individual sums of up to $25,000 for a maximum of fifteen years,
was given only to going concerns. Berkeley Burrell, director
of the National Business League, believed that by following this
policy, 0E0 was "looking for the impossible man— a person who
has (1) management ability, (2) good credit, (3) demonstrated
ability to repay, and (4) who is in poverty." The EOL program
did not begin to become even remotely viable until SBA was given
full cognizance over it in 1966.
Before this, however, there was an informal program
started by SBA in 1964, entitled the "6 by 6 Plan," which allowed
"disadvantaged potential entrepreneurs" to borrow up to $6,000
4for a maximum term of six years to start up a small business.
While being meager in amount, this did herald the first direct
attempt by the Federal government to provide venture, or seed,
capital to potential minority businessmen. In summary, though,
it can be said quite safely that there were no Federal programs
actively working to assist minority businessmen prior to 1968.
SBA Minority Business Assistance Since 1968
The year 1968 will be remembered for some time as the one
in which the racial crisis in our country reached it most vicious
J. Moore, private interview.
o
"Small Business Loans," New Republic (September 24,
1966), p. 9.
J. Moore, private interview.
U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Small
Business, statement before that Committee by Thomas S. Kleppe,
Administrator, Small Business Administrator, 92nd Cong., 1st
sess., Oct 20, 1971, p. 1.
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and devastating peak of activity. As discussed previously, the
issue of Black Capitalism was raised and the Nation faced a
serious moment of choice. The National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders advised that "an extreme social and economic
polarization" was taking place in our country. In its U.S. Riot
Commission Report of 1968, the Commission stated in part that:
To continue present policies is to make permanent
the division of our country into two societies: one,
the largely Negro and poor, located in the central cities;
the other, predominantly white and affluent, located in
the suburbs. ... If the Negro population as a whole
develops even stronger feelings of being wrongly 'penned
in' and discriminated against, many of its members might
come to support not only riots, but the rebellion now
being preached by only a handful.
1
If the above declaration sounds threatening, that is
exactly the impression it was trying to make. For 1968 was also
a national election year and the continuation of the race riots
that were sweeping the country at the time could only result in
political disaster to many incumbents.
President Johnson, looking to the SBA as one possible
source of solution, appointed Howard J. Samuels, former Under-
secretary of Commerce and successful businessman in his own
right, as Administrator of SBA in July of 1968. It was through
this appointment that the Federal government's Minority Enterprise
Program was launched and with it, a much more meaningful and
direct commitment to the needs of minority businessmen. 2
XBurtt, "Reading For Proof," p. 9.
2 U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Minority
Enterprise, Minority Business Deve lopment (Washington, D.C.:
Small Business Administration, T97T). (mimeographed.)
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Two months after he assumed office, Samuels announced
the creation of "Project OWN," A program designed to concentrate
on creating the establishment of minority-owned retail and
service trade businesses, primarily of the franchise type, in
twenty-eight cities. Under Project OWN, Samuels took existing
legislation governing loans to small businesses and used it,
for the first time, in a concentrated effort to assist minority
businesses. The emphasis was on SBA's loan guarantee program,
whereby SBA can guarantee up to 90 percent of a commercial bank's
loan to a minority businessman, or $350,000, whichever is less.
Samuels ' program relied on use of the existing commercial
channels of finance, and to ensure that support was forthcoming,
he began an energetic tour of the country talking personally to
many of the country's leading bankers and businessmen. In
fiscal year 1968, the SBA had made loans to minority businessmen
totaling $41.3 million. By the end of fiscal year 1969, this
amount had reached $104.6 million.
Just as important as the size of the loans Samuels pro-
duced was the change in attitudes that he was able to make . Both
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Comptrollers
Office issued instructions to their respective examination
staffs to look favorably on Project OWN and not to discourage a
bank's participation in this program as long as the bank's
U.S. Small Business Administration, Press Release,
September 4, 1968.
U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Small




overall condition was satisfactory. The American Banks Asso-
ciation also fully endorsed Project OWN and encouraged its
p
members to participate in the program as actively as they could.
With the change in Administration as a result of the
presidential election of 1968, Samuels' tenure with SBA became
short-lived. In his place President Nixon appointed Hilary
Sandoval, a 38 year-old Mexican-American small businessman from
El Paso, Texas, who had been that city's Republican mayoral
candidate. While many people felt that Sandoval was a man of
good intentions, he was not attuned to the Federal bureaucracy
which keeps Washington operating and he lacked experience in
dealing with an organization of the size of SBA.
Philip Pruitt, his appointee as Assistant Administrator
for Minority Enterprise, resigned within four months and was
publically critical of the President's commitment to minorities.
Another Sandoval appointee, Albert Fuentes , was indicted and
convicted of having engaged in a shakedown of a San Antonio
ornamental metal works in return for his approval of a $100,000
SBA loan. These two incidents placed both Sandoval and the SBA
in a bad light. Business Week reported in July of 1970, that
Sandoval was in trouble with both the President and the Congress
.
Sandoval resigned for reasons of health in late 1970, and in his
26.
"Financing Minority Business," p. 28.
2
"Project OWN Gets Going," Banking , LXI (February, 1969),
"Financing Minority Businesses," pp. 28-29.
"Sandoval Stands Siege at the SBA," Business Week ,
July 18, 1970, pp. 61-62.
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place President Nixon appointed Thomas S. Kleppe, a former
Congressman from North Dakota and the president of a successful
household products manufacturing company
.
At the same time that Sandoval was beginning to run into
trouble, President Nixon issued an Executive Order, on March 5,
1969, which he hoped would help give more direction and coordina-
tion to the total minority business development efforts of the
Federal government. By this Executive Order, the President's
2Advisory Council on Minority Business Enterprise was created.
The council was charged with the task of developing a blueprint
for:
. . , a national strategy that would ensure that
minorities assume a significant role in developing,
owning, and managing viable businesses during the
decade of the seventies.
3
The Council was composed of eighty-five persons, who represented
both the majority and minority business and financial communities
By this same Executive Order, the President created the
Office of Minority Business Enterprise (OMBE), in the Department
of Commerce, under the personal direction of Commerce Secretary
Maurice Stans , There appear to be three reasons for the
President's move to involve Commerce in the minority program.
First, since the issue was business and not just small business
"Financing Minority Businesses," p. 33-
U.S., President's Advisory Council on Minority Business
Enterprise, Minority Enterprise and Expanded Ownership: Blue-
for the 70's (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1971), p. iv.
Ibid.




it was logical to have the Administration's prime big business-
oriented agency bring its resources and influence to bear on the
problem. Secondly, since Commerce has a more powerful voice in
the total business community than any other single agency, it
was in a better position to help convince the majority business
community to give more assistance to minority businesses.
Thirdly, the 116 Federal minority programs administered at that
time by twenty-one separate agencies was totally uncoordinated
and overlapping in their individual attempts to aid minority
businesses . Whether OMBE can become a viable means of better
coordinating the Federal government's efforts toward assisting
minority businessmen or merely add another layer of administra-
tion between these programs and the people they are supposed to
help cannot as yet be determined.
The SBA 's Current Minority Loan Programs
The SBA has two primary loan programs which can provide
direct financial assistance to minority businessmen. These are
the Economic Opportunity Loan (EOL) Program and the 7(a), or
Operation Business Mainstream Program, In addition to these
loan programs, SBA has a loan program to help firms that are
displaced as a result of Federally-aided urban renewal and
other construction projects. This program will not be addressed
in this study since it applies to a rather specific category
of businesses. The final area of financial loans are provided
"Financing Minority Businesses," pp. 29-30.
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indirectly to minority businessmen through Development Company
Loan Programs, which operate on both the state and local levels. 1
Economic Opportunity Loans
The EOL Program provides long-term loans of up to $25,000
for a maximum of fifteen years to both going and prospective
minority entrepreneurs. The loans can be given directly by SBA,
in a participation plan with banks or other financial institu-
tions or in a guarantee argeement whereby SBA guarantees 90
percent of the bank's loan.
These loans are directed at low income people who are
considered "socially or economically disadvantaged" and who
cannot on their own secure any type of long-term credit from the
commercial lending institutions with reasonable terms. Every
applicant must demonstrate some assurance that he has the ability
to run a viable business . He must also have some of his own
money to invest, even though the amount is nominal, and SBA needs
some assurance that he can repay the loan out of accumulated
profits. This is the most flexible of SBA's loan programs,
since the key element in evaluating the loan application is the
character of the potential borrower, which is measured by the
judgment of the loan officer. It is also the smallest with re-
2
spect to the maximum amount of a single loan.
"'"U.S. Small Business Administration, SBA What It Is—
What It Does (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1970), pp. 3-7.
2U.S. Department of Commerce, Federal Programs Assisting
Minority Enterprise, p. 31.
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Operation Business Mainstream Loans
These loans are provided under the authority of Section
7(a) of the Small Business Act. Loans made under Section 7(a) can
be accomplished in one of three ways: (1) guaranteed loans, by
which SBA may guarantee 90 percent, or $350,000, whichever is
less, of a loan made by a commercial bank; (2) participation loans
by which SBA may lend up to $150,000 or an immediate participa-
tion basis with a commercial lender; and (3) direct loans, by
which SBA can provide a single unilateral loan of up to $100,000.
The guarantee plan is the most desirable from the stand-
point of SBA since the commercial lender is parting with his own
money and is more apt to take a continued interest in his bor-
rower, even with the SBA guarantee. The participation plan is
the next most desirable and is used only when the total funding
requirement cannot be met by a commercial lender and if an SBA
guarantee loan cannot be made. The direct loan plan is the least
desirable and will only be considered by SBA upon receipt of
substantiation that loan applications to at least two commercial
banks have been made and rejected. These loans may be obtained
for a maximum of ten years for a straight business loan, similar
to a long-term debt instrument to increase financial leverage;
fifteen years for construction purposes; and six years for
working capital purposes
.
The credit requirements for an SBA loan hinge on the
same criteria of character, capacity, condition, credit and
1
Ibid
. , p. 35 and U.S. Small Business Administration,
SBA Business Loans (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 19717TPP- I" 6 -
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capital as they would at any lending window, but the measurement
of these criteria is obviously more liberal or SBA assistance
would not be required. For a minority businessman, an even more
liberal approach is taken and, as with EOL assistance, character
is considered an extremely important factor. Another important
difference is that whereas a normal SBA loan applicant must be
able to provide at least one-half of the funds from his own
resources if the loan is for a new venture, a minority borrower
is required to provide only 15 percent himself. Even this re-
quirement can be lessened or even waived at the discretion of the
SBA Regional Director. Collateral for the loan is another
2
criteria that is given less consideration under this program.
To apply for a loan under either of these programs
requires that the minority businessman prepare a business package
for SBA as he would have to for any commercial loan. For an
established business this package consists of:
(1) A current balance sheet and profit and loss
statement for the past business year.
(2) A current personal financial statement.
(3) A list of collateral, at estimated present
market value, which might be used to secure the loan.
( k) A business plan, which should include pro forma
financial statements, sales forecasts and a statement of the
amount and purposes for which the loan will be used.







(5) Statements from commercial lending institutions
as to whether they will or will not grant a loan inde-
pendently, and if not, if they will join in an SBA
guarantee or participation program.
For a proposed new venture the package consists of:
(1) A detailed description of the proposed business.
(2) A description of the entrepreneur's business
and managerial experience and qualifications.
(3) An estimate of the financial backing that can be
obtained personally plus a current personal balance sheet.
(4) An earnings projection for the business' first
year of operation.
(5) A list of collateral, at estimated present market
value, which might be used to secure the loan.
(6) Statements from commercial lending institutions
as to whether they will be willing to grant a loan or
2join with SBA in a guarantee or participation loan.
Local Development Company Loans
The final lending program that will be reviewed is the
State or Local Development Company Program, sometimes referred
to as the 501 or 502 Programs, respectively, since they derive
their legislative authority from those two sections of the Small
Business Investment Act. These programs are designed to combine
1Ibid.
, pp. 13-15.
2 Ibid., pp. 13-15.
-'U.S. Small Business Administration, 1962 Annual Report
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 3h .
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the resources of the local community, including its lending
institutions, with those of the Federal government to create
increased business and job opportunities in economically de-
pressed areas. The most prevalent form of organization is the
Local Development Company (LDC)
.
To qualify for LDC money under this program a group of
at least twenty-five local citizens must design a business •
development plan for their community, quantify it in terms of
total investment required, and be able to invest from 10 to 20
percent of this total themselves depending on the population
of the community concerned. SBA then can join with the local
financial institutions, on either a guaranteed or participation
base, to raise the balance of the project's cost. As with a
7(a) guaranteed loan, SBA's limit is 90 percent or $350,000,
whichever is less.
The money thus raised can be used for the construction
of new plants, or the expansion, modernization or conversion of
existing plants including the acquisition of land, buildings,
machinery and equipment. The money cannot be used for the purpose
2
of increasing working capital.
The LDC program is not as significant to an independent
small minority businessman as the other two direct lending
programs since it is designed more for the development of larger
U.S. Small Business Administration, 502 Local Develop-







enterprises with the emphasis being primarily on the creation of
greater employment opportunities. However, for the purpose of
studying the potential viability of the MESBIC Program, the above
brief review of the LDC Program is considered important for two
reasons. First, it is a program that can combine the resources
of an individual businessman, his community leaders, his local
financial institutions and a Federal agency on a coordinated
basis to stimulate business development on a larger scale than
could be accomplished by a businessman on his own. Secondly,
and of even greater importance, is the fact that the direction
and control of the project is kept within the community. This
facet of the LDC Program is extremely important in the ghetto
areas where many other business development plans have failed
because the local citizens themselves have not had an opportunity
to help determine their own economic destinies.
Evaluation of SBA Loan Programs
From a quantitative standpoint, there has been a signifi-
cant increase in both the number of loans made by SBA to minority
businesses and the total dollar value of these loans. As Table
7 shows, the total percentage of the dollar value of all SBA loans
going to minority businesses has increased from 7 percent in 1968
to 19 percent in 1971. The number of minority business loans
has increased by 235 percent and the dollar value has quad-
rupled. The greatest percentage gains have been made in the EOL
area, where minority loans now account for slightly over 80
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A significant increase in the size of each loan has also occurred
In 1968, the average (median) size of an individual 7(a) loan
was $25,000. This figure has increased to over $57,000 in 1972.
Under the EOL program, which has a maximum limit of $25,000 per
loan, the average size of an individual loan has increased from
$10,700 to $14,000 in this same four year period. Although
averages taken by themselves can be misleading, the trend toward
larger individual loans may indicate that minority businesses
are getting larger. This, in turn, may mean a trend away from
the more marginal "Mom and Pop" type businesses which have a
much higher propensity of failing.
There is another trend developing the SBA loan program,
however, which has disturbed officials of the Agency's Office
of Minority Enterprise (OME) . Table 7 does show a continued
increase in both the total number and total dollar value of
approved minority loans. On a percentage basis, however, it also
shows what may be a trend of de-emphasis in these loan programs.
In 1970, 23 percent of the dollar value of all loans were made
to minority businessmen, but in 1971 this amount had decreased
to 19 percent. Through the first four months of fiscal year
1972, this figure is running at only 17 percent. SBA officials
interviewed by this writer did not wish to offer additional
information or personal opinions regarding this trend. However,
by piecing together information derived from each interview,
the following may prove to be some of the reasons why this
Richard Robinson, private interview at U.S. Small
Business Administration, Washington, D. C, October, 1971.
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decrease in the relative percentage of loans to minority
businesses may be occurring.
One reason may be due to the organizational structure
of SBA itself. As Table 8 shows, the Associate Administrator
for Minority Enterprise is on a lower rung of the organizational
ladder and his Office operates in a staff capacity along with
the Office of Administration and the Office of Planning, Research
and Analysis. Although this Office is the Agency's chief advo-
cate for minority enterprise, its administrator is an advocate
without financial portfolio. The office which has both policy
and budgeting authority for all direct lending programs, for
both small businesses and minority businesses, is the Office
for Financial Assistance. One official of this Office did
state that forecasts of earlier years had predicted that the
minority lending program would peak out by 1971, when it was
thought that commercial lending institutions would be carrying
the major share of the lending activities to minority businesses.
Another reason for this trend may be simply a matter of
workload. Since minority businessmen were expected not to be as
proficient in developing the loan paperwork package as the normal
small businessman, SBA created the position of Minority Enter-
prise Representative (MER) in 1968, and assigned a total of 100
of these minority specialists to its branch offices in -U 4 cities.
These MERs were drawn primarily from SBA jobs they had held in
the financial and management areas and 80 percent of them are
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establish a better rapport between the potential lendee and
the first SBA representative with which he would come in con-
tact. Secondly, the MER would be able to give the loan applicant
more assistance in working with the loan package than was normally
. , , 1provided.
The MER concept worked well until the loan business
made its gigantic growth in fiscal year 1969 . As Table 7 shows
,
the original 100 MERs, who processed 2,335 loans in fiscal year
1968, were required to process 7,776 loans in fiscal year 1971.
Since most minority loan processing takes a great deal more
time than normal loans, due primarily to the extra services pro-
vided by the MER, a point of diminishing returns had to be
reached sooner or later. The Agency has attempted to obtain
additional ceiling points to respond to this increased workload,
but the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has kept a freeze
on all new Federal hiring for the last couple of years and no
2
new MERs have been obtained. No relief appears to be in sight
either, since OMB's Budget Circular A-ll for fiscal year 1973,
clearly states that "personnel currently authorized will be
utilized to the maximum extent in staffing new programs and
U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Small
Business, statement before that Committee by Thomas S. Kleepe,
PP . 3-6 .
Harry Carver, private interview at U.S. Small Business
Administration, Washington, D.C., October, 1971.
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expansions in existing programs, and a reduced number of personnel
should generally be planned where the workload is stable."
A final reason for this trend may be due to the increased
loss rates on minority loans over the past five years which may
be causing some SBA officials as well as the banking community
to take a harder look at the liberal lending policies. SBA
charge-offs have been increasing substantially from a low of
3.5 percent in 1966, to a high of 21 percent in 1970. Some
increase was to be expected due to the rapid expansion of the
program, but the trend in losses seems to be growing at a com-
pound rate. A few observers feel that one of the reasons for such
an increase in losses is that the early loans were more apt to go
to minority businessmen who were already established in business
and had a higher probability of remaining successful. As the
program has grown it has become increasingly more difficult to
2find applicants as potentially capable of succeeding.
This loss experience has not been considered unusual,
since a 1971 study of major Eastern bankers revealed an 18
percent charge-off rate and a 9 percent delinquency rate. Most
of these loans were to retail concerns . A principal reason
given by these banks for the high loss and delinquency rates
was the fact that the banks themselves did not follow up on the
business progress of their lendees because the size of the loans
U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Preparation and
Submission of Annual Budget Requests , Circular A-ll (Washington,
D.C. : Executive Office of the President, June 21, 1971), Sec.
13.2, p. 10.
"Financing Minority Businesses," p. 13.
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were so small, averaging $13,000 per loan. Chase Manhattan indi-
cated that its initial loss experience in minority business loans
was 15 times higher than its normal rate. Lack of entrepreneural
knowledge on the part of the lendee and lack of experience on the
part of the bank in knowing how to properly assist this class of
lendees were cited as the two major reasons for this high initial
loss rate, which bank officials fully expect to lessen in the
future
.
In summary, then, it can be seen from this brief review
of the SBA's history and programs that much greater attention has
been given to the financial needs of minority businessmen in the
last three years. But while the lending programs are important,
they do not provide the same degree of permanency to the financial
structure of a minority business as does a more permanent type
of equity capital. It was for this reason that the Small Business
Investment Company (SBIC) program was looked to in 1969 as a






THE SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT COMPANY PROGRAM
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is first to discuss the
legislative history and provisions of the Small Business Invest-
ment Act, since it governs both the Small Business Investment
Company (SBIC) and the Minority Enterprise Small Business Invest-
ment Company (MESBIC) programs. Next a review of the highlights
of the SBIC industry's tempestuous history will be made since it
was functioning for eleven years before the MESBIC program was
launched. The purpose is to see what operational pitfalls have
been encountered in the development of this industry. This will
allow us to see whether they are being avoided in the MESBIC
program. Finally an analysis of the performance of the SBIC
industry will be given with respect to satisfying the equity
needs of the small business community.
The Small Business Investment Act
Since World War II, there has been growing concern over
the future of the small businessman in our country. Much of
the debate has centered around whether small businesses are able
to obtain adequate financing to keep them somewhat comeptitive
in this era of the corporate giants. Between 19^9 and 1958,




designed to provide more Federal financial assistance to small
businessmen. The Small Business Administration, with its loan
and management programs was created as one means of assisting
small businessmen. But there seemed to be something still
missing in the total financial machinery. This missing element
was a ready source for small businessmen to obtain financial
assistance of a more permanent nature, e.g., equity or long-
term capital.
During 1957, the House Small Business Committee and the
Senate Banking and Currency Committee continued to hold hearings
on small' business problems. The testimonies varied from that
of Mr. Maxwell of the American Bankers Association who felt that
the normal lending institutions provided adequate financing, to
that of Dr. A. D. H. Kaplan of The Brookings Institution who
believed that a device such as the National Investment Act was
needed tc assist small businessmen. He felt that small business-




It was not, however, until the Federal Reserve Board
issued a report entitled Financing Small Business to the Congress,
in April of 1958, that a comprehensive analysis of the financial
viability of the small business community was better understood.
In summary, the report indicated that the small businessman
received a smaller percentage of the total loans issued by member
U.S., Congress, House, Select Committee on Small
Business, Credit Needs of Small Business, Hearings , before




banks in the period 1955 to 1957 than larger businesses, based
on the relative numbers of businesses in each sector. Further,
the average size of the loan for businesses with assets of less
than $5 million had decreased. Smaller companies also faired
less well in obtaining long-term loans than did larger firms.
Although the overall net findings did not provide con-
clusive evidence that small businesses were being financially
discriminated against to any sizeable degree, the report did
conclude that sources of financing were not adequate to the
apparent needs of small businessmen, primarily in terms of long-
term credit. This report, along with the preponderance of
Congressional testimony that favored increased Federal assist-
ance, paved the way for passage of the Small Business Investment
Act of 1958.
In passing this Act, the Congress declared that:
The policy of the Congress and the purpose of this
Act (is) to improve and stimulate the national economy
in general and the small-business segment thereof in
particular by establishing a program to stimulate and
supplement the flow of private equity capital and long-
term loan funds which small-business concerns need for
the sound financing of their business operations . . .
and which are not available in adequate supply . . . this
policy shall be carried out in such manner as to insure
the maximum participation of private financing sources.
2
U.S. Federal Reserve System, Financing Small Business
,
Report to Committee on Banking and Currency and the Select
Committee on Small Business by Federal Reserve System, Parts 1
and 2, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., April 11, 1958, pp. 122-125.
p
U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Small
Business , Small Business Investment Act of 1958 , as amended by




In carrying out this declaration, the Act was designed primarily
to stimulate the private sector to create investment companies
that would be geared solely to the equity and long-term finan-
cial requirements of the small business community.
The privately-owned investment institutions so created
under this Act are called Small Business Investment Companies
(SBIC) . As such, an SBIC is conceived by the Act as a permanent
profit-making institution. The prime incentives to stimulate
the formation of SBICs are low-cost Federal financial leverage
support and tax incentives in the event of failure. The ulti-
mate objective of the Act was to help close the financial capital
gap facing small businessmen through federally supported but
privately managed financial institutions . The Act established
the Small Business Investment Division in SBA and charged it
with Federal administrative responsibilities of licensing and
2
regulating the SBIC industry.
The minimum financial requirement to qualify for a SBIC
license is $150,000 of private paid-in capital and paid-in
surplus. A national bank is eligible to purchase shares in a
SBIC, but is restricted to investing no more than 5 percent of
its capital surplus . Further, a bank may not own 50 percent or
more of any class of a SBICs equity securities and cannot
U.S. Small Business Administration, Starting a Small
Business Investment Company (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1969), pp. 1-5-





possess voting rights. Some SBIC's are owned by small groups of
local investors, some are organized as subsidiaries of national
business concerns and others are publicly traded. With respect
to the individual owners, the SBA has strict regulations to
ensure that SBIC's are not formed as holding companies for the
purpose of obtaining Federal lending for an owner's other busi-
ness ventures and that potential conflict of interest issues are
avoided.
With respect to borrowing power, the Act does allow a
SBIC to obtain long-term funds from SBA, which is probably the
key incentive to the concept. The SBA may either purchase or
guarantee the purchase of an SBIC's debentures up to 200 percent
of the combined paid-in capital and paid-in surplus of the
company, with a maximum limit of $7-5 million. In addition,
if an SBIC has paid-in capital and surplus of at least $1 million,
and has 65 percent of its total funds available for investment
either invested or firmly committed in venture capital invest-
ments, the SBA can either purchase or guarantee the purchase of
$2 million in debentures plus 300 percent of the paid-in capital
and surplus which exceeds $1.0 million. The maximum amount that
SBA can either purchase or guarantee in this situation is $10.0
million
.
In addition to the words "or guarantee" with respect to
the SBA's ability to purchase a SBIC's debentures is the most
1Ibid. , sec. 302.
U.S. Small Business Administration, SBA Rules and
Regulations Part 107, as amended 36 F.R. 18858 (Washington, D.C.
Government Printing Office, 197D, sec. 107.901 and 107.1004.
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recent amendment to the Act. This guarantee proviso now gives
the SBA increased flexibility to underwrite a private lending
institutions 's loan to a SBIC, similar to the underwriting
of a bank's direct loan to a minority business.
The debentures sold to or guaranteed by SBA may be
p
subordinated and may have a term of up to 15 years. Since the
prime emphasis of the program is on venture capital, the maximum
leverage factors above provide the greatest incentive for SBIC's
to structure their investment portfolios in that direction. One
important stipulation of the Act is that federal funds will be
provided to a SBIC "... only to the extent that the necessary
funds are not available to (the SBIC) from private sources on
reasonable terms.' The SBA makes the final determination as to
the reasonableness of the terms.
A SBIC can invest in a small business concern primarily
by buying Its equity securities or by making it a long-term
loan. For purposes of the Act, both forms are considered venture
h
capital financing. The word primarily is used because a SBIC
can make short-term loans to a small business concern with which
it already has invested long-term money, but only when it is
considered in the interests of protecting the SBIC's primary
5investment
.
Small Business Investment Act ., sec. 303(b).
Starting a Small Business Investment Company , p. 14 .
^Small Business Investmen t Act., sec. 303(b).
SBA Rules and Regulations , sec. 107.3-
5 Ibid., sec. 107.504.
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The primary emphasis again is on equity financing and
the hope is, of course, that as the small business grows and
prospers so will the SBIC's investment in the form of capital
gains . To ensure that there is a reasonable degree of permanency
in the investment, the SBIC must hold the initial security for
at least five years with repayment not due until this earliest
"maturity" date. The equity securities may be in the form of any
class of stock and may include convertible, warrant and option
. . 1provisions
.
Long-term loans may be issued as such or with warrants
enabling the SBIC to purchase stock in the company during a period
of time not to exceed ten years. Convertible debentures may also
be issued. The interest rates for these instruments are subject
to negotiation between the SBIC and its client, but are subject
to the regulations of the governing state and may not exceed
15 percent in any case. Loans and debentures must be issued for
a minimum of five years and voluntary amortization during the
first five years cannot exceed 20 percent of the principal per
2year. The Act specifies a maximum lending period of twenty years,
with a ten year extension if the SBIC believes that the additional
3time for liquidation will be in its own best interest.
There is a limitation on the amount of financing a SBIC




2 Ibid. , sec. 107-301.
Small Business Investment Act, sec. 305(d) and (f).
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in a company. Without the express approval of the SBA, A SBIC
cannot invest more than 20 percent of its combined paid-in
capital and paid-in surplus in any one company. Except in rare
instances, an SBIC or two or more SBICs acting as joint financiers
cannot exercise control over a small business concern. Besides
the normal 50 percent voting stock rule, SBA defines control as
being any situation in which the SBIC owns as much of a voting
2interest in a small business as any other one block of stock.
The only exception made to this rule is when the small business
concern and the SBIC have entered into a fairly negotiated plan
at the time of financing as a mutual contractual obligation.
The plan must be approved by SBA and cannot extend beyond seven
3years .
With regard to a SBIC's investment portfolio, no more than
one-third of the total portfolio may be invested in any one set
of business concerns classified together as a major group in the
Standard Industrial Classification Manual issued by the Office
of Management and Budget. A SBIC cannot lend money to a com-
pany for the purpose of relending or reinvesting, for the
development of unimproved real estate, for gambling or mono-
polistic interests or for production of agricultural commodities.
In addition, the small business concern can purchase goods or
1 Ibid. , sec. 306(a)
.
2SBA Rules and Regulations , sec. 107-901 (a) and (b)
3Ibid . , sec. 107.901 (d) .
^Ibid., sec. 107-101 (e).

82
services from a supplier, who in turn is an associate of an
owner of that SBIC, only if less than 50 percent or more of the
funds borrowed from the SBIC are used.
Besides the incentive of being able to borrow leverage
money from the SBA, a SBIC also enjoys a substantial tax ad-
vantage over normal investment companies . First an investor in
a SBIC can treat losses in the value of his stock as a normal
operating loss and not a capital gains loss, which gives him more
flexibility in applying this loss. Gains, however, can be treated
2
as capital gains. Second, a SBIC itself can treat losses in its
investments as normal operating losses and can deduct 100 percent
of the amounts received as dividends on its investment from its
earnings for tax purposes. SBICs are also exempt from paying the
accumulated earnings surcharge as long as they are actively en-
gaged in providing funds to small business companies in compliance
I]
with the Small Business Investment Act. These, then, are the
major tax incentives available to the management of a SBIC.
Performance of the SBIC Industry
Since its passage in 1958, six major revisions have been
made to the Small Business Investment Act in an attempt to make
it a more viable instrument of public policy. Some of the
1Ibid. , sec. 107.1001.
U.S., Congress, House, Technical Amendments Act of 1958,





4U.S. Treasury, Accumulated Earnings Surtax Exemption ,




amendments have been made to cover loopholes and provide more
stringent Federal control over the SBIC industry in the wake of
some extremely bad publicity received by it. Other amendments
have been designed to expand the capabilities of SBICs by
providing more Federal funding and greater operating flexibility. 1
An example of the negative criticism that caused legis-
lative revision is testimony that was given to Congress in 1966
by Elmer B. Staats, the Comptroller General of the United States,
when he disclosed that the SBA's financial and accounting records
contained inaccurate and incomplete information with respect
to the SBIC industry, and especially the status of SBA loans.
One of the cases he cited to support his findings concerned the
Cascade Capital Corporation, in which he stated that:
Cascade Capital Corporation of Spokane, Washington,
was licensed as an SBIC in April, 1961. Its capital con-
sisted of $191,000 in private funds and $317,000 in SBA
money. It also lost money steadily since the beginning
of its operations.
The first SBA examination of this SBIC was in April
of 1962. At that time, it had a deficit of 30 percent.
In September of that year, the deficit reached 51 percent,
and by April, 1963 it totaled 96 percent. In spite of
this record, SBA advanced a total of $190,000 to Cascade
during this deficit period.
The records show little action by SBA during 1963
and 1964 to protect the Government funds other than
correspondence to request additional private capital and
to ask for a plan to bring the company into profitable
operations
.
In June 1964, a conference was held between officers
of Cascade Capital and SBA representatives, who recom-
mended to Washington that an immediate assignment of the
Small Business Investment Act , p. iii.
p
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Opera-
tions, Investigation into Small Business Investment Company
,
Hearings before the Permanent subcommittee on Investigations of
the Committee on Government Operations, Senate,. 89th Cong., 2nd
sess., August, 1966, pp. 55-73.
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SBIC's assets be obtained to protect the Government. No
action was taken until April of 1965 when the SBIC was
examined again. Continued financial deterioration was
shown. The deficit had grown to 15 8 percent, completely
wiping out the private stockholder's interest.
No action was taken in 1966. SBA officials told
GAO that some tentative attempts to merge the SBIC were
unsuccessful. No request for a receiver was made, but
SBA indicated that it might be done shortly. The deficit
had grown to 190 percent at the time of the last report.
1
On the more positive side, in 1966 applications for SBIC
financing reached new highs; SBA evidence showed that small busi-
ness concerns were making good use of the SBIC funding received,
with one study showing that companies receiving SBIC funding had
increased profits nearly 400 percent; and for the first time in
its history, the SBIC industry reported net profits for the
fiscal year ending March 31, 1966.
In testimony before Congress, the SBA ' s Administrator
stated
:
The great bulk of the companies in the industry have
the bare minimum of private capital required by statute.
The inadequacy of such resources is reflected, intangibly,
in poor management skills and, tangibly, in a low return
on invested capital. For the year ended March 31, 1966,
SBICs in this category (statutory capital and surplus
of $325,000 or less) actually suffered a loss of 2.3
percent on their investment.
We undertook a detailed study to determine the size
of the SBIC which would stand the best chance of estab-
lishing and maintaining a profitable operation. In this
study, we attempted to develop a model to meet such
requirements. The results of this study indicated to us
that at least $1 million of private capital would be
necessary to (1) interest prospective investors and com-






U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency,
Small Business Amendments of 1967, Hearin gs, before subcommittee
on Small Business of the Committee on Banking and Currency,
Senate, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., June 1, 1967, p. 59.
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(3) make thorough investigations of investment prospects;
(h) maintain continuous service for portfolio concerns
including advisory services; (5) insure a competitive
return on investment; and (6) create reasonable prospects
for success.
1
While the above testimony may appear at first glance
to be self-condemning, it really was meant to set the stage
for revisions to make the industry stronger. The revisions
that ensued changed the law so that all SBA investments in SBIC
would be of the subordinated debenture variety, and not both
debentures and straight loans. This tended to give the SBIC
a more permanent type equity base by which to utilize commercial
leverage. Further, the 1967 revisions increased the maximum




The SBIC industry has had a tempestuous fourteen year
history, as can be seen by the data in Table 9. Although there
was much interest in the concept to begin with, only 86 companies
had been formed by early I960. Some SBA officials claim that
this slow initial growth rate was not well received by the White
House and so the Agency conducted a hardsell campaign and
licensed anyone who looked even remotely like a possible SBIC
candidate. While the truth of this cannot be confirmed, Table 9
does show that a dramatic increase in the number of licenses
issued occurred between I960 and 1962.
Another important factor in this rapid growth pattern
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emergence of the small technologically-oriented "hot issue" growth
companies. Both of these factors further stimulated the fast
rise of public SBICs, which itself was considered a potential
high flyer. The SBICs themselves appeared to invest heavily in
these new growth companies, which completed the self-fulfilling
prophecy that as long as one link in the chain remained healthy
all would remain healthy.
The dawning of recognition that this prophecy cut in both
directions finally came in May of 1962, when the market collapsed.
The index on SBICs fell from 23 in 1961 to 7.7 in May of 1962.
A typical example is the case of the Greater Washington
Industrial Investments Company, a SBIC that financed a computer
and systems analysis company whose stock rose in market value
from 8 to 90. Greater Washington's stock, riding on the success
of this investment, rose in value from 8 1/2 in i960 to 31 1/2 in
1961. When the computer company's stock fell in 1962, Greater
Washington 's stock dropped to 6 5/8.
Whether for better or for worse, the events of 1962
pretty well closed the door to the continued formation of the
publicly-owned type of SBIC. The learning curve appeared to
be long and hard for both Congress and the SBA, as the early
annual revisions to the initial legislation shows . The lesson"
to be learned was that a SBIC could be as harmful to small
businesses as it was supposed to be helpful. By supplying








financing to these precariously founded long-shot ventures, which
might have been refused financial support from a wiser and more
mature financial institution, the SBIC could help to aggravate
any instability already present in the market. More seriously,
the SBIC could do this with the taxpayer's money.
By 1966, the SBIC industry appears to have reached its
maxima, in terms of the number of SBICs and the total financial
strength of the industry. As Table 9 shows, 700 SBICs were
licensed with a combined total assets of $710.2 million as of
March 31, 1966. This was also the first year that the industry
made a profit, but it was not until 1968 that the combined
retained earnings figure finally went into the black. Although
the figures in Table 9 look good, they do not tell the full
story
.
Between October 1964 and April 1966, SBA considered that
the number of problem SBICs increased from 129 with $35 million
in SBA funds outstanding to 232 with $67 million. The Agency
expected to lose about $18 million on investments in 103 SBICs
totaling $37 million. In a speech to SBIC managers in June of
1966, Richard E. Kelley, associate administrator of the SBA '
s
investment division, confirmed that about one-third of all
SBICs were problem companies. Fifty-five of them had lost at
least half of their private capital, seventy were either under
investigation or being sued by the SBA, sixty were either
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and
Currency, The Small Business Investment Program, Hearings before
a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,
89th Cong., 2nd sess., July, 1966.
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inactive or about to give up their licenses, and forty-seven had
seriously violated SBA regulations. Kelley's speech made quite
a stir in the financial world, but as the editors of Fortune
pointed out, he failed to properly qualify his condemnations.
Kelley later explained to Fortune that actually the problem
companies were almost all small, privately held SBICs and that
three-quarters of them were one-man operations
.
This then gave recognition to the second big object les-
son to the industry. A small, marginal SBIC trying to help small,
marginal businesses only compounds the probability of failure by
both ventures. From this point on, the SBA began to plot the
track record of the SBIC industry by looking at four separate
financial classifications: those with total paid-in capital
of up to $300,000 in size I, those between $300,001 and $1
million in size II, those between $1,000,001 and $5 million in
size III, and those above $5 million in size IV. As will be
shown later, there has been a marked difference in the perform-
ance of the different size groupings, but not always as SBA has
thought would occur.
One example of the change of investment policy and
philosophy many SBICs were forced to take, as a result of the
May 1962 fiasco, is described by the experience of the Electron-
ics Capital Corporation (ECC) of San Diego. This SBIC company
rode the boom of i960 and 1961 when its stock zoomed from $10
per share to $70 nearly overnight. In May, 1962, the price
],,The SBICs Road Back," 19 4.
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fell to $6 per share and ECC ' s chairman Charles E. Salik had to
change the rules of his game.
ECC was formed in 1959 to provide venture financing to
new electronic companies. Besides funding, ECC also was able to
provide its clients management consulting services, a research
laboratory and a central sales organization. Of the first seven
ventures, three succeeded, two merged and two failed. After the
market fell in 1962, ECC was hurt badly and was not able to
become really investment active again until 1965 . But when ECC
did begin looking for investments, new ventures were totally
ruled out. Salik wanted only solid businesses with proven
records and annual sales of approximately $8 million. Only under
those conditions did he feel that the risk was worth the gamble.
As a result of ECC's new investment policy, it became the largest
SBIC in 1967 with assets of $26 million and a steady but growing
1
earnings pattern.
While this experience of ECC makes interesting reading
as a "success" study of a struggling SBIC, the success is only
in the eyes of the beholder -- Charles Salik. For the purposes
of the small business community, ECC became just another closed
financial window to it. With a no new venture and sales of
$8 million investment policy, both sound criteria for a normal
investment company to follow in order to avoid the disaster once
faced by ECC, the company could barely be called a SBIC in
"Thinking Big About Small Business," Business Week
January 7, 1967, pp. 123-125.
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terms of the original concept. As a matter of fact, ECC has
since surrendered its license to SBA.
From 1966 to 1971, the SBIC industry became profitable
but the total number of SBIC's has decreased from 700 in 1966
to 442 in 1971. Much of this decrease was planned by SBA, and
was forecasted earlier by SBA Administrator Boutin, who had
stated in 1963:
I would forecast that within the next twelve months
. . . we will have this program down to 350 companies.
Some will go by merger, some by voluntary surrender of
their licenses, some by court action, and some by admin-
istrative action by SBA.l
It was under his tenure that the 19 67 amendment was
passed which incentivized the formation of larger and more stable
SBICs . This lack of incentive for the larger SBIC was probably
one of the other reasons ECC left the SBIC business. Greater
Washington Investors, another of the large SBICs, also left in
1967 and cited as one of the reasons the lack of flexibility
that caused it to reorganize and establish a wholly-owned SBIC
subsidiary so that the parent company could continue on its own,
yet still have a subsidiary that was smaller and more in line
2
with the prevailing SBIC philosophy.
As Table 9 shows, the years 1967 to 1970 were profitable
ones for the SBIC industry, but no conclusive evidence has been
given as to why this has been so. That the industry finally
"SBICs: Rocky Road Looms Ahead," Business Week
,
July 20, 1963, p. 65.
p
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Exemptions
from Investment Act of 19 40 Hearings , before the Securities and




began to develop some maturity in its operations is probably
one reason. But what affect can be attributed to the overall
growth pattern of our economy and the prolonged war effort in
Vietnam cannot really be known or measured. Whether SBICs
would have fared as well in a different economic climate is
hard to say, but the fact that the industry lost money in 1971
might well be a leading indicator of future viability.
A. H. Singer, the SBA's current associate administrator
for operations and investments, in his forward to the 1971
annual SBIC Industry Review , stated that:
The SBIC industry's financial results are highly
sensitive to the cyclical nature of the economic and
financial systems . . . the data . . . must be evalu-
ated in light of the generally unfavorable economic
conditions which prevailed during the period. 1
This statement was given in partial justification of the
industry's 6.7 percent decrease in rate of return from a positive
3.1 percent in 1970 to a negative 3.6 percent in 1971.
As the figures in Table 10 show, it was the largest
SBICs that sustained the heaviest losses in 1971 and they also
made the fewest number of disbursements.
The disbursement mix for this same period is shown
in Table 11.
As Table 11 shows , the smallest SBICs continue to be
invested heavily in loan financing while the larger SBICs have a
more diversified portfolio. What cannot be reconciled is why
U.S. Small Business Administration, SBIC Industry





SBIC RATES OF RETURN (ROR) AND DISBURSEMENTS
FOR YEAR ENDING MARCH 31, 1971







I ($300,000 or less) l.k% (0,,2%) 426 $ 9.6
II ($300,001 to $1
million) 3.1 (1..7) 972 35.5
III ($1,000,001 to
$5 million) 5.0 1,.8 768 56.6




Source: Small Business Administrat ion, SBIC Industry Re view,
pp. 1-2.
TABLE 11
SBIC DISBURSEMENT MIX FOR 19 71
SBIC Capital Size Loans Debentures Cap:Ltal Stock
I 75.0$ 18.8* 6.2$
II 57.7 20.3 22.0
III 37.6 32.7 29.7
IV 32.1 33.1 3^.8
All Sizes (weighted) 1)2.5% 29.2$ 28.3$




the size IV SBICs fared so poorly as compared to the size III,
which disbursed more money during this period and had nearly the
same portfolio balance as the larger size. More significant,
though, is the fact that only 57-5 percent of all Investments
made during the year were of a more permanent equity type.
One disturbing trend has been the marked rise in allow-
ances for losses over the past four years. In 1968 the allowance
was $35.6 million, or a little over 5 percent of total assets.
These figures were held nearly constant in 1969 and 1970, but in
1971 the allowance was raised to $44 million, or approximately
7.2 percent of total assets. This accounted for a $9 million,
or 2.8 percent, decrease in net worth during this last year.
Effectiveness of the SBIC Frogram
In gross totals, the SBIC has 8455 investments out-
standing as of March 31, 1971, for a total value of over $472
million. Of these totals, 4033 investments valued at a total
of over $28l million were in debt securities and capital stock.
It is estimated that since 1958, the Industry has made over
37,000 investments providing $1.8 billion in financing to the
small business community. The SBA had provided $447 million to






Ibid. , Appendix 2, p. 3
%.S. Small Business Administration, Budget Estimate —
Fiscal Year 1972, sec. S and E, (undated), p. 40 . (mimeographed)
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While these figures appear impressive they do not go to
the heart of the issue by asking whether the SBIC program has
really been effective. The true test is to see what real affect
the program has had on the small businesses who have been served
by the SBIC industry. There is a paucity of available data In
this area, but a SBA study of l,38l firms who received SBIC
assistance leads one to conclude that at face value the data does
indicate that the companies have benefited. The study marked
the period from March 1967, before SBIC assistance, to December
1968, after SBIC assistance. It revealed:
(1) Employment rose by 29 percent with 1,800 new jobs
created
.
(2) An average increase of 42 percent In gross revenues
was achieved.
(3) Profits more than doubled from $11.1 million to
$22.2 million.
(4) Net worth increased 18.8 percent from $179 million
to $213 million.
(5) Total assets increased 36.8 percent from $711
million to $975 million.
(6) SBIC assistance increased the ability to obtain
an increase of 22.2 percent in short-term borrowings
from commercial sources from $113.4 million to $138.6
million.
^
A recent survey conducted by SBA, using sampling tech-
niques approved by 0MB, attempted to assess the value of SBIC
assistance in less quantified terms. The survey posed a list of
questions to the small businesses selected. The most important
questions and their responses were as follows:
"'"U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on Small
Business, Organization and Operation of the Small Business





(1) Why did you seek SBIC financing:
63.8 percent either could not get financing
elsewhere or could not get reasonable terms.
(2) Why were you refused financing elsewhere:
89.8 percent cited either unsuitable terms,
their venture was too risky or their requests
exceeded lending limits
.
(3) What was the purpose of the loan:
33.8 percent needed additional financing and
31.8 percent needed start-up capital.
(4) Did your business benefit by SBIC financing:
95.5 percent answered yes and 55.5 percent
of these indicated the benefit was considerable.
(5) Were you satisfied with your dealings with the SBIC:
85 percent said yes and of the 15 percent who said
no, 39.1 percent stated that their inability to
get all the money they felt they needed from the
SBIC was the main reason.
(6) What^ In your opinion, is the type of assistance
most needed by small businessmen:
This was an open-ended question and a variety of
responses were received. However, 60 percent
indicated financial assistance and 27 percent said
managerial assistance. (A respondent could have
cited both reasons and the responses were included
in both figures.)!
In analyzing the results of both of these surveys it must
be kept in mind that the respondents were businessmen who had
actually received SBIC assistance. Therefore, the results are
undoubtedly biased somewhat in favor of the SBIC industry. Un-
fortunately, what is not available is comparative data of those
small businesses who were denied SBIC assistance. What is not
known is how successful and prosperous they have or have not
become during the same time periods. It is possible that some
of these businesses who were denied assistance are really the
ones for whom the Small Business Investment Act was written.
"'"U.S. Small Business Administration, Small Business




However, this type of information is not known and one can only
keep these questions in mind to qualify the data that is avail-
able and keep it in perspective. The data available so far does
lead to the conclusion that in general those few who have
received SBIC assistance have tended to prosper and that the
recipients confirm this belief.

CHAPTER VI
THE MINORITY ENTERPRISE SMALL BUSINESS
INVESTMENT COMPANY PROGRAM
The Beginning of MESBIC
In a 1968 campaign speech, later called the "Bridges
of Human Dignity" address, then presidential candidate Richard
Nixon made a verbal commitment to the cause of minority business
development. He stated his position by saying:
What we need is to get private enterprise into the
ghetto, and put the people of the ghetto into private
enterprise--not only as workers but as managers and
owners. Then they will have the freedom of choice they
do not have today; then the economic iron curtain which
surrounds the black ghettos of the country will finally
be breached.
1
Although the speech made no mention of any specific pro-
gram, it set the stage for the creation of the Office of Minority
Business Enterprise. From this office came the announcement, in
November of 1969, that the Commerce Department and the Small
Business Administration were going to co-sponsor a new program
(MESBIC) to provide equity capital to the minority business
community. A greater "piece of the action" became the slogan
of Project Enterprise, and Commerce Secretary Stans set a goal
of licensing one hundred MESBICs with a potential to create
1As quoted in Minority Enterprise and Expanded Owner-








At this point two questions must be raised. The first
seeks to answer why the SBIC concept was used for the minority
program. The second asks why a different type of SBIC was needed
if in fact this type of financial program was considered proper.
The answer to the first question is rather straight-
forward. As was pointed out in the last chapter, the era 1966
to 1969 was a prosperous one for the SBIC industry, with profits
reaching an all time high of 9*5 percent. Optimism was strong
for the continued viability of the industry. Also the Government
knew that something more than the existing SBA loan programs
was needed, but it had little real experience in dealing with the
minority business community. Since a reasonably viable small
business equity funding industry was already in existence, it
seemed logical to use it as a model for assisting the minority
businessmen
.
The answer to the second question has a political as well
as an economic rationale. From the political standpoint, the new
Republican administration had made a strong verbal commitment
during the campaign and needed a visible and Republican-invented
program to give proof to its promise. A new program, aimed and
titled specifically at the minority population was probably hoped
to given them this proof. From an economic standpoint, the SBIC
industry, per se, was not geared at that time to the needs of
1Rocco C. Siciliano, "A Piece of the Action," Nation's
Business, LVII (March, 19 70), 58.
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the minority businessman. SBA rules governing SBIC operations
were considered to be too restrictive for proper assistance to
minority businessmen and there was a natural fear of over-
liberalizing the whole industry. Another element that was desired
in the MESBIC program was the strong sponsor concept and a greater
emphasis on managerial assistance to the investment company
clientele. Finally, it was considered mandatory that a MESBIC
be located as close to its potential customers as possible, since
it was to be an integral part of the community. This would make
the MESBIC both visible and readily accessible to the people it
served and also help overcome an inherent distrust of anything
with a Federal label.
The first real MESBIC was actually licensed as a SBIC
over a year before the program was formally announced. On
August 13, 1968, the SBA issued a license to the Areata Invest-
ment Company of Menlo Park, California. Areata Investment was
created as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Areata National
Corporation, a company primarily in the redwood lumber business
but also involved in printing and data handling activities. The
idea of creating an investment company dedicated solely to
assisting in the development of minority-owned business was
fostered by Areata National's president, Robert Dehlendorf II.
He had become greatly disturbed at the racial crisis developing
in our country during 1967, and especially the assassination
of Martin Luther King. He felt that big business had a public
lnMinority Businesses Gain With U.S. Help," Commerce
Today, I (January 11, 197D, 12-14.
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responsibility to assist in the urban-racial crisis and believed
the Areata Investment might be one way to put his feelings into
action
.
Areata Investment was capitalized at $150,000 from the
parent company and received a separate budget for salaries and
administrative costs. Dehlendorf hired Derek (Pete) Hanson, a
Stanford MBA graduate to direct the company and pledged the
parent company to contribute 2 percent of its after-tax profits
to Areata Investment for its first five years of operations
.
Areata Investment received an SBIC license from the SBA and even
under the SBIC rules it managed to help finance more than 35
black-owned or black-oriented businesses during its first 18
months of operations. Areata Investment gave a total of nearly
$500,000 to these businesses which, when combined with the owners
private investments of $400,000, enabled these businesses to
receive another $1 million in financing from banks and other
lenders
.
Areata Investment has not been totally as successful as
the above figures would imply, but it has assisted many minority
businesses to become more viable. One key to Areata Investment's
success has been the philosophy by which it is managed. As
Dehlendorf has said:
Areata Investment functions as does the management of
its parent company every day of the week. It puts
dollars behind the right man, with the right product or
service, to meet a market need. It is not 'do-gooding'
in the true sense of the word, nor is it attempting to
lnThe MESBICs Are Coming — But Slowly," Black Enterprise ,
I (September, 1970), 27.
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fill the role of the social worker or the educator,
functions to which most corporations are ill-suited.
In reviewing proposals, the stress has been on
community economic need and increased employment in
profit-oriented businesses, both within and outside
the local disadvantaged community. What we call 'one
man band' or 'fat cat' oriented proposals are screened
out A
Areata Investment, then, became the model by which SBA
and OMBE patterned the new MESBIC industry. Pete Hanson, the
first director of Areata Investment, has since become OMBE '
s
MESBIC program director.
The remaining portion of this chapter will be devoted
first to looking at the legislative and operational characteris-
tics of the MESBIC which differentiates it from a SBIC. Next
the brief history of the program will be plotted. Finally, the
effectiveness and criticisms of the program as currently
voiced will be presented.
Legislation and Structure of the MESBIC
A MESBIC, like a SBIC, is governed by the rules of the
Small Business Investment Act. However, the SBA, by the regu-
latory powers granted to it by this Act, has made changes in its
SBA Rules and Regulations governing the SBIC industry to tailor
the MESBIC program to the needs of minority businessmen.
The first amendment to these SBA Rules and Regulations
which affects minority businessmen was made in early 1969,
before the MESBIC program was formally announced. This change






five years to any persons "... whose participation in the
free enterprise system is hampered because of social and
economic disadvantages."
The purpose of this amendment was to give SBICs a little
freedom and encouragement to expand their portfolios to include
lendings to minority businessmen. But the actual response of the
SBIC industry to minority businessmen has been very weak. Of the
industry's total disbursements of $156 million in 1971, only
$5.4 million, or 3.5 percent, were made to persons classified
2by the SBA as disadvantaged.
The second major amendment to SBA Rules and Regulation s,
with respect to minority businessmen, was made in July of 1970.
In this change, MESBICs were formally defined as a:
License company licensed solely for the purpose
of providing assistance which will contribute to a
well-balanced national economy by facilitating the
acquisition or maintenance of ownership of small
business concerns by individuals whose participation
in the free enterprise system is hampered because of
social or economic disadvantages .
3
In addition to defining a MESBIC, this amendment also
authorized regular SBICs to operate MESBICs as wholly- or
commonly-owned subsidiaries . This authority to operate a MESBIC
can be with or without actual participation, but the parent
SBIC is prohibited from using SBA borrowed funds to capitalize
a MESBIC and each licensee must own at least 20 percent of the
MESBICs voting stock, except by prior SBA approval. Once
'''SBA Rules and Regulations Part 107 , sec. 107.505.
2
SBI_C Industry Review , p . 2 .
^SBA Rules and Regulations Part 107, sec. 10 7.3-
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properly capitalized, the MESBIC subsidiary can borrow funds
from the SBA on its own and it can utilize unused financial
eligibility of the parent SBIC. 1
The most recent amendment to the SBA Rules and Regula-
tions has four important changes that broadens the scope of
MESBIC operations: 2
(1) A MESBIC is now exempt from the diversification of
investments requirements, which limits a normal SBIC
from concentrating more than 33 1/3 percent of its
portfolio in a single major group of business activities
as defined by 0MB. This allows a MESBIC to gain more
expertise in a particular type of business, which is
especially important in its managerial assistance
program.
(2) MESBIC can now invest as much as 30 percent of its
total capital in any one investment. Since MESBICs
to this point in time are much smaller in average size
than SBICs, this revision allows MESBICs to provide
more funds to what is hoped will be larger minority
businesses. The objective is to give the MESBIC
greated freedom to invest in more than just the more
marginal retail type businesses to which the former
limit of 20 percent tended to restrict them.
(3) The third key change has been to allow any SBIC/MESBIC





less than the five year minimum limit formerly re-
quired. The new minimum is now thirty months, but the
revision applies only to loans to disadvantaged
businesses
. Although important to both the MESBICs and
the SBICs, in terms of being able to roll-over their
investments more rapidly, this revision would appear to
be directed more toward encouraging SBICs to lend more
to the minority business community.
(4) The final important change allows a portfolio invest-
ment concern of a MESBIC to use more than the normally
allowed 50 percent of the funds received to buy goods
and services from a supplier associated with a MESBIC.
The maximum amount has been raised to 75 percent.
There are three key factors that differentiate a
MESBIC from a SBIC: 1
(1) MESBICs are allowed to make loans only to business
firms that are at least 50 percent owned or controlled
by minority interests.
(2) Each MESBIC must be backed by a strong sponsor organi-
zation. This sponsor or parent can be a corporation,
business, group or organization that can provide,
either directly or indirectly, the necessary $150,000
minimum private capitalization for the MESBIC. In
addition to capital funds, the sponsor must also commit
itself to support a good portion of the MESBIC's







operating funds as well as managerial assistance to
both the MESBIC and the companies in the MESBIC 's
portfolio
.
(3) The MESBIC is prohibited from using more than $12,000,
or 8 percent, of its initial capital to support its
own operating expenses . It must cover the amount in
excess of this maximum by other means, which usually
implies the sponsor organization.
The reasons for requiring the strong sponsor concept
appears to be twofold. First, the SBA's early experiences with
the SBIC industry has made it want to better insure that the
marginal SBICs, which caused it so much trouble in the early
1960's, do not reappear as marginal MESBICs . By having a strong
managerial staff to assist it, like Areata National did for
Areata Investment, the MESBIC can maximize its ability to provide
the services for which it was designed and not spend the majority
of its time trying to keep its own financial head above water.
The sponsor can make its whole range of staff services available
to its MESBIC, which can give even a newly licensed MESBIC a
better degree of managerial maturity.
The second reason for the parent concept is the added
functions a MESBIC is supposed to be able to perform for its
portfolio firms. As was shown in Chapter II, the black
community has not been able to acquire a high degree of managerial
expertise and business acumen over the years. Since the emerging
black businessmen need managerial as well as financial guidance,
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the SBA and OMBE hope that the MESBIC can become a vehicle to
deliver both needs to their clients .
In concept, the MESBIC is designed to provide three
types of managerial assistance:
(1) Planning . The MESBIC is supposed to help its applicants
in developing basic business strategies and plans for the
venture in question. This basic guidance is designed to'
give the applicant a clearer sense of overall direction
so that the investment it receives has a better chance
of being used to its maximum advantage.
(2) Counseling . Once the investment has been made, the
MESBIC tries to maintain a continuing relationship
with its portfolio firms, and on a day-to-day basis if
necessary. The MESBIC can turn to its sponsor company
for assistance in helping to advise the client in
answering many "how to" type questions, such as how to
submit bids for contracts more effectively. This daily
contact also allows the MESBIC to make periodic checks
of the business pulse of its clients and possibly
anticipate potential problems before they emerge.
(3) Technical Assistance . As problems are discovered,
through this hoped for close dialogue between MESBIC
and client, the MESBIC can help seek outside assistance
that the client may not know exists. There are many
organizations and groups, such as the U.S. Chamber of






who may be able to provide specific assistance at
little or no charge to the client.
It can be seen, then, that in concept at least the
MESBIC structure can help provide two and possibly all three
of what the President's Task Force on Improving the Prospects
of Small Business has defined as the three major needs of small
businesses: (1) sound managerial counseling; (2) adequate
equity capital, the type especially critical to the small busi-
nessman; and (3) better trained people. In addition, by estab-
lishing a continuing relationship for at least the minimum
lending time of thirty months, the MESBIC can help bolster its
businesses during much of their initial crucial period. As the
Task Force said:
Statistics show that the first five years of a small
business' life are critical for survival. They all shew
that a very high percentage of business failures are
attributable to lack of management competence and ex-
perience. Those who finance small business say that
financial assistance without effective managerial counselinj
often leads to ultimate loss. The net result is that small
businessmen at times have been hurt by the very financial
assistance that was intended to help.
2
Much has been said in selling the MESBIC program
concept of the maximum 15 to 1 potential lending leverage
possible. Table 12 shows how this figure is theoretically
derived:
"*"U.S. President's Task Force on Improving the Prospects
of Small Business, Improving the Prospects of Small Business
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 3.





Original MESBIC Capital $ 500,000
SBA Loan to MESBIC 1,000,000
"Seed Capital" investments in
minority ventures 1,500,000
SBA-guaranteed bank loans to
minority ventures 6,000,000
Total Capital Flow to
minority ventures $7,500,000
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, MESBICs
and Minority Enterprise
, May 1971,
p . 22 .
In the above example it is assumed first that the MESBIC
is able to acquire $500,000 in private equity capital. Then it
can borrow $1 million from SBA on a 2 to 1 basis to give it a
total capitalization of $1.5 million. Next it is assumed that
the MESBIC invests all of its money in minority businesses on an
equity basis . The SBA is then prepared to guarantee up to
90 percent of commercial loans to these companies using a maximum
debt to equity ratio of 4 to 1. Theoretically, the MESBIC and
SBA together have been able to take an initial private invest-
ment of $500,000 and leverage it fifteen times over to "create"
a total of $7.5 million of new capital to the minority business
community
.
MESBIC Growth and Performance to Date
When Commerce Secretary Stans announced the MESBIC pro-
gram in November of 1969, he hoped to have 100 MESBICs licensed
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and operating by June 30, 1970. On that date, however, 111
tentative commitments had been made but only sixteen license
applications had been received and just twleve MESBICs were
licensed and considered operational. By the end of September
of 1970, nineteen licenses had been issued. Stans stated that
this lag between initial commitment and actual licensing was due
to time-consuming but necessary legal work by the MESBIC spon-
sors . An SBA official confirms this fact but also states that
license applications were being closely screened to avoid the
problems encountered in the initial licensing of SBICs when
quantity was considered more important than quality. The total
cost in both bad publicity and problem SBICs had far outweighed
any benefits received in the early 1960s by over-licensing.
As of late December of 1970, twenty MESBICs were in
operation with an average total capitalization of $300,000.
Twenty-nine MESBICs had been licensed by April of 1971, with a
total private capitalization of $5-9 million, supplemented
by $1.8 million in SBA borrowed funds. These MESBICs had
received 1699 loan applications totaling $28.1 million and had
disbursed $3 million in funds to 192 different businesses.
"^Charles L. Frankel, "The Uphill Road to Black Capital-
ism," Nation's Business , LVIII ( December, 1970), 65.
Kermit L. Culver, private interview at U.S. Small
Business Administration, Washington, D.C., January 1972.
•^"Federal Minority Business Programs Establish 'Solid
Beginning' For Future," Commerce Today , I (December 28, 1970),
22.
^"Lending To Minority Firms To Build on Early Success,"
Commerce Today, I (May 3, 19 71), 24.
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Of these disbursements, 158 had been straight loans, twelve had
been purchases of debt securities and only twenty-six had been
pure equity investments.
Licensed MESBICs total forty-three in number as of
February 1, 1972. They have helped to finance 270 businesses
which employ over 2,200 people and have an estimated annual
payroll of $11 million with annual sales of over $45 million.
These MESBICs have a total capitalization of about $11.3 million
and a potential leverage factor which could allow them to provide
over $150 million in new financing to minority businesses.
Of the forty-one MESBICs in operation as of December of
1971, a capitalization-size breakdown is shown in Table 13.
Eighteen of these MESBICs were capitalized within $10,000 of the
minimum of $150,000. The two largest MESBICs, Alyeska Invest-
ment Company of Anchorage, Alaska, and Ban Cap Corporation of
New York City, are capitalized at $1 million each.
One of the MESBIC concepts is to get the lending institu-
tion as close to its potential customers as possible. A MESBIC
distribution by location is shown in Table 14 . It would appear
from this distribution that the MESBICs are attempting to locate
in the areas of heavy minority group concentrations. But the
"'"U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Small
Business, Statement before that Committee by Thomas S. Kleppe,
pp. 12-13.
2
"Nixon's New Program To Strengthen Aid to Minority-




locations of the MESBICs, except for the noticeable paucity of





and Surplus Total Number of MESBICs
Not more than $200,000 20
$200,000 to $500,000 18
Over $500,000 3
Source: "Nixon's Administration Responds to Its
Black Critics," Black Business Digest , II
(December, 1971), 64.
Table 15 gives a breakdown, as of March 31, 19 71, of the
disbursements by geographical area of the twenty-one reporting
of the twenty-eight licensed MESBICs at that time. The figures
do confirm that the greatest lending activity has been in the
Middle Atlantic, East North Central, South Atlantic and East
North Central regions. Even here, though, the figures must
be reviewed closely since the preponderance of disbursements
going to the South Atlantic region is concentrated in Maryland,
with only one disbursement in the District of Columbia. The
East North Central region also shows a serious gap with not one
disbursement being made in Illinois, most specifically Chicago.
A breakdown of the total outstanding disbursements of
these twenty-one reporting MESBICs, by type of industry shows
that nearly 75 percent of the total number of disbursements were




DISTRIBUTION OF MESBICs BY GEOGRAPHIC
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Area Served Number of MESBICs



























Source: "Nixon's Administration Responds To Its
Black Critics," Black Business Digest ,




LICENSED MESBIC LOAN AND EQUITY DISBURSEMENTS BY REGION

























































































50,000Total 198,863 - 248,863
Pacific
Washington - $ - - $ - - $ - - $ -
Oregon
California 66 725,164 1 40,000 8 72,600 75 837,764
Alaska - - - - - - - -
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Total 224,899 40,000 37,200 302,099
East South Central - - - - - - - -
West North Central - - - - - - - -





- - - - -
-
125 :i , 424 , 157
Source: Small Business Administration, SBIC Industry Review .
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about 70 percent of the dollar value of these disbursements. The
retail trades and service activities combined received just over
53 percent of the total number of disbursements and about ^6
percent of the total dollar value . Although it is to be expected
that the greatest initial effort of the MESBIC disbursement
activity will be in the retail and service areas, since these
types of business concerns dominate the ghetto areas, it would
appear encouraging that even at an early stage of development,
the MESBIC industry is involved in supporting manufacturing type
ventures
.
The above figures are all derived from Table 16 , which
further shows a breakdown of these disbursements by loans, debt
securities and capital stock. As might be expected, the majority
of disbursements are of the loan variety. Only 8 percent of
the total number of disbursements to non-manufacturing industries
were of the capital stock type, but over 27 percent of the
disbursements made to manufacturing industries were of this
type .
Table 17 is the first condensed financial statement ever
published for the MESBIC industry. By itself it does not tell a
very complete story since there are no standards or trends by
which to compare it. Yet it does show that the industry sustained
a 19 .6 percent net loss from operations during its first active
year, which decreased its total capital stock by 16.3 percent,
or over $855,000.
The industry as a whole appears not even close to being
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MESBICS CONDENSED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
AS OF MARCH 31, 1971






Cash and U.S. Government Obligations
Loans to Small Businesses (Sec. 305)
Equity Securities of SBCs (Sec. 304):
Debt Securities of SBCs
SBC Capital Stocks and Stock Rights
for which Separate Costs Have Been
Determined
Gross Loans and Investments
Less: Allowances for Losses
Net Loans and Investments














Funds Borrowed from SBA




Capital Stock, Amounts Paid on
Stock Subscribed, and Paid-in
Surplus
Retained Earnings (Deficit)







































TABLE 17 - Continued
Condensed Statement of Income
Expense For the Year Ended
March 31, 1971
and 21 Reporting of
28 Licensed Companies
Amount Percent
I n c o me
Income from Loans and Investments
Management Consulting Service Fees
Net Income (Loss) from Assets
Acquired in Liquidation
All Other Income
Total Gross Operating Income
Expense
Interest and Other Financial Expenses
Operating Expenses
Total Expenses
Net Income from Operations Before
Provision for Losses and Income Taxes
Provision for Losses
Provision for Income Taxes
Total
Net Income (Loss) From Operations
Realized Gain (Loss) on Investments
Less: Provision for Income Taxes
Net Realized Gain (Loss)
Combined Net Income (Loss) from
Operations and Realized Gain (Loss)
























Source: Small Business Administration, SBIC Industry Review .
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having borrowed only $1.8 million based on a paid-in capital of
over $4.1 million. Additionally, the industry has not utilized
commercial borrowing itself to increase its financial structure.
The fact that over 65 percent of the industry's total
assets are uncommitted to investments to minority businesses
is disturbing as a whole, but since most of the MESBICs are only
about one year old, the reasons for this inability to make more
investments cannot be fully explained.
Since any further attempt to draw conclusions from this
one picture of the MESBIC industry's financial condition might
tend to mislead the reader, no further reference will be made to
it except to draw attention to the high provision for loss
expense allocation.
One encouraging statement can be made, however, and that
is that as of early January, 1972, no MESBIC has been forced to
surrender its license for financial reasons. The initial growth
of the industry may not be as dramatic as the initial growth of
the SBICs, but it appears to be on a bit more of a solid footing.
MESBICs Potential Effectiveness
Both OMBE and SBA have taken an optimistic but fairly
realistic attitude toward describing the current and future effec-
tiveness of the MESBIC program. There is overall confidence in
the ability of MESBICs to provide more financing and managerial
assistance to minority businessmen, but both Agencies appear




SBA Administrator Thomas S. Kleppe admits that the MESBIC
industry's performance to date has not been substantial, in
absolute terms, but at least it has been a beginning in filling
a need that no other program was doing. He points out that SBA
has been determined to license only sound and well-sponsored
MESBICs to ensure that the MESBICs do not become problems in
themselves. He speaks highly of the responses he has received
from the corporate giants, such as General Motors and Standard
Oil, and the degree of corporate commitment they are willing to
make toward making the MESBIC program a more successful means of
assisting the disadvantaged. Kleppe feels that representatives
of national corporations "now have a common forum through the
MESBIC vehicle to discuss financial and economic problems of the
disadvantaged on a national, as well as a local basis." By
becoming directly involved with the disadvantaged on a basis they
know best, the business environment, he believes that the
corporate giants can give the minority businessmen a significantly
greater representative voice speaking for them.
With respect to this representative voice, a listing of
the MESBIC sponsors does read somewhat like the listing of
Fortune's 500. Some of the better known names include Prudential
Insurance, General Motors, Phillips Petroleum, Transamerica,
International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT), General Foods, Olin
Corporation, Standard Oil, Chase Manhattan Corporation, Sun Oil,
Bank of America and Atlantic Pipeline.
U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Small




In addition to the wide variety of sponsors, SBA feels
that each MESBIC appears to be structured along lines that best
meet the environment in which it exists. For example. Oppor-
tunity Capital Corporation (OCC) of San Francisco is sponsored
by a consortium of twenty-one corporate investors, including
Bank of America and Standard Oil of California. It shares office
space and management with Opportunity Through Ownership, another
firm that provides special financing for minority businesses. The
secretary of OCC is a manager of an investment management firm and
other directors represent banking and national industrial firms.
OCC then has a strong and experienced managerial background to
help it develop over the initial and critical operating years.
Rutgers Minority Investment Company of Newark, New Jersey
presents a different type of organizational framework. All
capital has been provided by ITT of New York, but the graduate
business school of Rutgers University provides the office space
and management assistance to the MESBIC. This arrangement
provides a unique opportunity for potential future corporate
leaders to actively participate as business consultants and to
2
gain a better understanding of minority business problems.
A final example of the flexibility possible in organizing
a MESBIC is the case of the soon to be operational Minority
Equity Capital Company (MECCO) . The initial capitalization of
$1.2 million for MECCO comes from the Ford Foundation and the
Small Business Investment Company Digest
, pp. 23-24
2 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
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Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Although based in New York
City, this MESBIC will invest in minority businesses in New York,
Newark, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, New Orleans, Dallas and
St. Louis. The reason MECCO will be able to reach a broad geo-
graphic area is that it will be an affiliate of the Interracial
Council for Business Opportunity (ICBO), a highly successful
minority enterprise business consulting organization also funded
by the Ford Foundation. This coupling of a proven minority
business management assistance organization in seven cities with
a centrally available equity funding organization would appear to
have a tremendous total assistance potential.
The Commerce Department's OMBE has assessed the MESBIC in
terms similar to that used by SBA . It cautions potential sponsors
not to begin a MESBIC without adequate pre-planning and a gradual
start-up phase. OMBE further advises that a MESBIC should be
prepared for many potential failures in its investments and that
it must be willing to stand by its clients for relatively long
periods of time. A MESBIC is further advised to keep a low pro-
file in the community and be sensitive to the desires and goals
2
of the businesses and community it serves.
It would appear by the tone of these assessments that
both Agencies would rather be a bit deliberate in developing
the MESBIC industry in order to avoid the setback experienced
in the early years of the SBIC industry. This confidence factor
"Ford Foundation Invests Millions to Promote Minority
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is a vital one since the ultimate success of the MESBIC program
hinges to a great degree on how well the minority communities
accept and use this Federally-backed program.
The MESBIC program is not without its critics, though,
and two of them are Richard S. Rosenbloom and John K. Shank of the
Harvard Business School. Both writers collaborated in a Harvard
Business Review article late in 1970 in which they advocated total
abandonment of the program since they consider it wholly ineffec-
tive in both concept and operation.
Rosenbloom and Shank concede that minority economic
development can proceed faster than it has in the past only with
a great influx of capital, but that the MESBIC program is not
the proper vehicle.
They first analyze the program from a straight business
approach, and advise potential sponsors to look at a MESBIC using
the same "managerial scrutiny" as they apply to their own busi-
nesses . In other words , if a corporation wishes to make a social
commitment to fostering minority business development, it should
measure the potential success of a MESBIC venture under a common
capital investment criteria with other possible vehicles for
achieving the same goal. Businessmen should not allow themselves
to be oversold by the Government on the merits of MESBIC as a
means of meeting the goal when there may be better vehicles
available.
Richard S. Rosenbloom and John K. Shank, "Let's Write




According to Rosenbloom, two crucial assumptions underlie
the MESBIC program, and both are probably incorrect. The first
assumption is that "excess capital" from the white community can
be induced into the program. This assumption is considered wrong
since no substantial amount of "white" money can be drawn into
the ghettos when the risks are so high and the potential rewards
so little. The SBA loan guarantee program, to him, has not
stimulated a much greater amount of minority business lendings
.
The second assumption is that the minority businessmen will be
able to repay their loans in periods of fifteen or twenty years.
Rosenbloom feels this assumption fails to recognize that any new
businessman, regardless of color, needs really permanent equity
capital and that an "all-debt financing" medium, regardless of
the length of maturity, must eventually be repaid, and with
interest. He does not feel that many businessmen can repay their
entire equity base in this period of time and still have enough
of their own capital, accumulated primarily by the earnings of the
business, to remain at the same financial size to which they have
2hopefully grown.
Rosenbloom feels the MESBIC program does not provide
any new methods for corporations desirous of helping minority
businesses since it is based on the same model as the SBIC
program. He challenges the potential 15 to 1 financial leverage
the SBA and OMBE claim for the program on the grounds that there
For purposes of simplicity, further references to both






is no assurance that commercial lending institutions will be this
liberal on a 4 to 1 equity to debt ratio. He is further critical
of the minimum capitalization of $150,000 required by SBA on
three grounds. First, he cites SBA figures that show that it
was the small SBICs that caused them so much trouble in the mid-
1960 's . Second, he believes that the smallness of the MESBICs
will only foster a greater proliferation of marginal retail
businesses, since the maximum investment restriction does not
give a MESBIC an opportunity to help develop new businesses of a
large enough scale to really benefit the ghetto communities. The
third criticism concerns informal SBA guidelines which require
that a MESBIC must have at least two well-qualified full-time
managers on its staff. He feels that this excessive overhead
burden even with sponsor support will make a serious cash drain
on the MESBICs treasury.
Leaving the faulty operating characteristics of a MESBIC
from a purely business standpoint, Rosenbloom next looks more
closely at the basic purposes that a program such as MESBIC
should have if it is truly intended to bolster the economic
potential of the communities served by the minority businesses
.
He sees that the development of local businesses should strengthen
"three interlocking 'economies' in the community," which
includes
:
1. The income economy — Development improves the
community standard of living by increasing earning capacity
and hence purchasing power; or by making goods and services






2. The political economy — Development enhances the
political power of the community by increasing its control
over important economic resources.
3. The psychological economy — Development raises
the self-esteem of both the individual and the community
through increasing the community's control over itself.
-
1-
Rosenbloom feels that control is a central issue here
and that it is this control that a minority business has to
strengthen the three economies of its community that is of real
importance. Although the income economy is important, he feels
that the major potential contribution a stronger minority busi-
ness sector can make is in strengthening the political and
psychological economies of its community. To accomplish this
objective will require the development of larger, more efficient
businesses that can truly compete in the economic mainstream.
The MESBIC program, by its emphasis on the marginal businesses,
cannot do this. A final drawback is that if the vehicle to
supposedly help develop these new business enterprises is con-
trolled by the same white outside interests that already domi-
nates the black community, then the political and psychological
objectives cannot be met because the community still has not
2
received its independence.
In conclusion, Rosenbloom believes that while there are
some technical adjustments which can be made to help make the
MESBIC a more viable instrument, like raising the minimum
capitalization from $150,000. to $250,000, it still cannot re-




2 Ibid., pp. 9^-95.
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control is not in the hands of the black community, the ultimate
objectives cannot be met.
Probably the best known and most quoted critic of all
Federal disadvantaged welfare and assistance programs is Theodore
L. Cross, lawyer and editor-in-chief and publisher of The Bankers
Magazine . His book Black Capitalism: Strategy for Business in
the Ghetto proposed a broad scope plan of community development
which he is now beginning to put into action on an experimental
basis in the Office of Economic Opportunity.
Cross starts at the beginning by trying to define the
objectives of our government-industry programs to stimulate
economic development in the ghetto. Although not openly critical
of the workings of the MESBIC program, per se, he does challenge
the entire concept of any program to create a greater supply of
black businesses . He feels that in so doing, we are creating a
supply when there is no demand. Cross firmly believes that we
must follow the teaching of Lord Keynes and worry first about
creating reasons for having truly viable larger-scale minority
businesses, of a size that have a real impact on the minority
communities . This means that we must first create a demand for
goods and services that no one is now satisfying. If this demand
is strong enough and only the minority business community can
satisfy this demand, then new black businessmen will clamor
to meet this demand. They will be adequately financed, too,






willing to take a lending risk because this risk will be far
outweighed by the potential profit gains
.
If we are truly serious about minority business develop-
ment, then Cross feels we should begin by working with the only
side of the basic supply-demand equation that can really be
controlled by the government. As he states:
We will then set aside either through tax incentives,
direct rewards, legal sanctions, or through a redirection
of government purchasing -- a segment of national eco-
nomic scarcities than can be satisfied only by the
mercantile acts and employment of disadvantaged people
of their neighborhood corporations .
2
Cross feels that the easiest and most controllable place to start
is in the whole area of Federal procurement. By establishing
firm and sizeable set-aside rules for direct Federal spending and
using clauses in prime procurement contracts which require a
greater degree of subcontracting through disadvantaged businesses,
we can create this demand for goods that will in turn create a
demand for businesses. If this situation can be successfully
brought about, most of the current business stimulation pro-
grams, like MESBIC, may no longer be required.
The total Opportunity Funding Corporation concept that
Cross advocates brings in many aspects of ghetto community
development that extend far beyond the scope of this paper.
However, his concept of rigging the forces of the marketplace
Theodore L. Cross, "A White Paper on Black Capitalism,"








in favor of disadvantaged businesses could be a highly dynamic






The primary question this study has sought to answer is
whether the MESBIC program can become an effective Federally-
sponsored vehicle for providing venture capital to black busi-
nesses. My conclusion is that it can, but only if its objectives
are more carefully defined and segmented and if its structure
and method of implementation are changed in line with its revised
objectives . The concept is good, the need is present and the
potential for success is favorable. But as the MESBIC program is
currently attempting to function, it stands little chance of beinj
an effective vehicle for helping black business to achieve the
degree of viability sought, either in ghetto economic development
or in entering the economic mainstream. Before describing some
changes which may be necessary to make the MESBIC program more




First, it has been shown that black-owned businesses
are not even closely operating in the American economic main-




the economic development of black communities. Second, the black
communities themselves are caught in an economic deprivation trap
from which they cannot escape on their ovm . Racial discrimination
plus the lack of a business heritage have kept blacks from acquir-
ing the entrepreneurial and managerial expertise and an accumula-
ted wealth base by which to build a strong business community.
Business and economic opportunities are becoming more readily
available to them, especially in the inner cities from which whites
are fleeing at an increasing rate. Yet the majority of these
opportunities are of marginal profitability, since they are loca-
ted in high unemployment areas where high incidents of crime and
social unrest make the probability of success extremely unfavor-
able. Third, although the banking communities, both black and
white, are making small but sincere attempts toward becoming
more available to black businessmen, the element of risk is still
so high that even the most liberal banker is able to assist to
only a limited degree. The conclusion, then, is that if real
progress is to be made in fostering greater black business develop-
ment, which must be considered an unquestionable public goal on
both moral and economic grounds, it cannot be made without the
aid of the Federal government. This is true especially in the
area of providing necessary venture capital.
The SBA loan programs have been effective in providing
more direct money to black businessmen and in supporting commer-
cial loans made to them. But loan programs alone can only be used
to leverage privately invested equity capital, the key financial
ingredient most potential black businessmen lack. The
SBIC program, designed to serve the same equity needs of small
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businessmen in general, has had a turbulent history. Even
fourteen years after its founding, this industry must still be
considered only marginally effective, and the element of racial
discrimination has not been a factor. But from it came the
basic framework and legislative background by which the MESBIC
program was founded.
The MESBIC program has been modified somewhat to over-
come the inherent shortcomings of the SBIC program, but after
a little over two years in operation it is hardly the panacea of
the minority businessman's equity capital needs. Probably the
most basic problem of the program is that there is really no
clear-cut definition of its objectives. If we want to get more
black businessmen in the economic mainstream, then its minimum
capitalization requirement of only $150,000 will not allow this
to happen. By this, a business may be interpreted as being in
the economic mainstream only when it has a marketing base that
at least transcends the inner cities and serves customers of more
than one color. Conversely, if we want to make true economic
development in the ghetto areas, the program is weak in that it
operates in a vacuum with respect to being part of any overall
ghetto development program.
Another weakness of the present MESBIC program, which is
somewhat akin to the criticism of its operating in a vacuum, is
that it tends to mix up the order of the four ingredients neces-
sary to create a viable business. The concentration seems to be
on getting money first, then in finding the right man, and hope
that he has some entrepreneurial expertise, and finally in
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looking for the profitable business opportunity. This follows
Theodore Cross ' idea that we are concentrating on finding a
supply of businessmen first and then on looking for a product
demand in which to employ them, instead of concentrating on the
demand function first. If this premise is not correct, the
question has to be raised as to why the MESBIC industry, and even
the SBIC industry, has such a large portion of its assets as yet
uninvested. Nor have the SBICs or MESBICs fully used their SBA
borrowing potential. Granted that many MESBICs are still getting
organized, it still seems strange that if there are that many
good investments around, then MESBICs should be a bit more
heavily invested, and more of their investments should be in
equity ventures rather than in debt lendings. The point being
that it appears that the MESBICs are not yet attuned to the needs
of the communities they serve, because I do not concur with
Cross ' belief that there are little current demands for black
businesses . The blacks living in the ghettos are spending
their money somewhere, and they could be spending at least some
of it in black-owned businesses.
The program also fails to allow for some solution to the
dilemma a really active MESBIC can find itself in if it is
actually fully invested. Since the minimum portfolio turn-over
is five years, assuming the investments are of an equity nature
which is the purpose of the program, the MESBIC is stymied from




Finally, the OMBE/SBA "coordinated effort" has been
somewhat less than that. By the President's directive, OMBE
is the minority business development coordinating arm of the
Federal government. However, the money for the program, the
legislative authority for licensing and regulating MESBICs and
the responsibility for MESBIC performance belongs solely to SBA
.
OMBE announced the program and OMBE set the goal of 100 MESBICs
by June 30, 1970. Yet it was SBA's responsibility to meet this
unrealistic goal. A Robert Morris Associates study on the
financing of minority business quotes a Chamber of Commerce
report which states that there is a legacy of "bitter inter-
agency squabbles, the absence of clear lines of authority and
direction, and a continued lack of strong Presidential visi-
bility" which has lessened the impact of the Administration's
efforts in behalf of minority enterprises.
It would seem then that OMBE may be more of a hinderance
than a help to the cause of black business development. By the
same token, though, without OMBE's push, SBA may never have
developed the program on its own.
Assessing the MESBIC Potential
The President's Advisory Council on Minority Business
Enterprise has found that although all of the factors required
to stimulate minority economic development are not known, it is
known that the development of a viable economic base is essential
It further states:
"Financing Minority Businesses," p. 33.
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The time is ripe. Throughout the nation's minority
communities, there is a growing demand for sufficient
economic independence to participate effectively in
the system. Too often, a lack of access to the power
structure breeds an atmosphere of frustration and anger
. . . the disadvantaged, particularly the poor, cannot
help but be aware of the discrepancy between their
economic condition and that of the larger society.
1
Blacks appear to be willing to live in a semi -peaceful
coexistence with the majority community, at least temporarily,
to see whether it is really sincere in its promises of helping
blacks acquire greater economic independence. A recent shooting
of a black burglary suspect by the police in Hunter's Point, a
black ghetto of San Francisco, points out his sense of restraint,
whereas a similar incident in 1966 created a riot that re-
quired 2,000 National Guardsmen to quell, this time Hunter's
Point black community action leaders kept the lid on the ghetto
and instead sought legal remedies to this potentially unjustified
homicide. This change of attitude was due mainly to the fact
that the Hunter's Point residents now have an economic stake in
their community and do not wish to see it destroyed. By a slow,
systematic process of elimination, blacks are buying out white-
owned businesses and are developing a viable economic base on
their own.
In addition, more white businessmen are becoming in-
creasingly attuned to the needs of black businessmen and are
willing to participate in black business development. They are
Minority Enterprise and Expanded Ownership: Blueprint
for the 70 's
, p. 5.
2David DuPree, "Joining the System," The Wall Street
Journal
,
Jan. 4, 1972, p. 1.
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willing to provide money, managerial talent and moral support
to their black counterparts, but need a successful vehicle by
which to channel their efforts
.
Blacks also appear to have the talent, the desire and
the determination to become successful businessmen. Ed Murphy,
a District of Columbia black who grew up in the heart of the
city's ghetto, is about to build a $7.5 million black-owned hotel
which may be but the start of a whole series of large-scale
business ventures for him. Owner of a supper club and a super
market, Murphy fought long and hard to get financial backing
for his new venture. He finally received his money, after three
and a half years of hard work, from the Economic Development
Agency, under a disaster-loan grant. Even here, though, most of
the money will not go directly to him but to a nonprofit organi-
zation that will lease the hotel to him. As Murphy has said:
When a black is applying, and the people reviewing
the loan run into a snag, instead of looking for alter-
natives, they want to throw it out. . . . If I had it
to do over again, I'd rather pay more interest for a
bank loan. You can't imagine how nerve-wracking it's
been for a man of action like me .
2
Carolyn. Walker of the District of Columbia's Interracial
Council of Business Opportunity Office and Michael Wallach of
Michael Brower and Doyle Little, "White Help for Black
Business," Harvard Business Review , XLVIII (May-June, 1970),
4-6.
p
Aileen Jacobson, "The Gamble of A Black Businessman,"
The Washington Post, Potomac Magazine , Jan. 16 , 1972, p. 14
.
Carolyn Walker, private interview at Interracial Council
For Business Opportunity, Washington, D.C., January, 1972.
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the Mayor's Economic Development Committee"1" both echo Murphy's
words and contend that there are plenty of potentially successful
black businessmen available if only they would be given a fair
chance
.
There are also plenty of readily available business
opportunities. The District of Columbia Metropolitan Transit
System (Metro) development fiasco is a good case in point. Metro
has been able to award only about $1.5 million of the first $300
million in contracts to black-owned firms . Metro officials claim
that the reason for this is that the black bidding firms have
neither the "financial or technical capabilities to handle most
2
of the more lucrative contracts .
"
In the industrial world itself there appears to be a
growing demand for new suppliers. As large-scale manufacturing
concerns continue to specialize more on the production of finished
end goods and less on the production of fabricated parts, the
percentage of component parts being purchased externally is con-
stantly increasing in comparison to the number of parts being
produced internally. As modern purchasing, or materials manage-
ment, functions increase in importance, buyers are constantly
seeking new sources of supply. In many cases, a manufacturer is
faced with the prospect of creating a new supplier to meet his
Michael Wallach, private interview at Mayor's Economic
Development Committee, Washington, D.C., January, 1972.
2Kirk Scharfenberg, "Metro Impact Already Large," The
Washington Post
, Jan. 9, 1972, sec. N, p. 1.
Lamar Lee, Jr., and Donald W. Dobler, Purchasing and




needs. In such instances, these companies are willing to provide
a new supplier with financial, technical and managerial assistance
as well as a ready market for his products. So contrary to
popular belief, I believe that the trend toward industrial big-
ness can create a ready demand for more minority businesses con-
centrating in the manufacturing industries.
In view of these facts, I believe that the MESBIC can
become an effective vehicle for providing venture capital, as
well as other vital ingredients, to minority businessmen. First,
it is privately capitalized and managed, which means that the
Federal government can withdraw its financial support someday
without disturbing the managerial operations of the MESBIC.
Second, it provides the best vehicle in which a white businessman
can channel his efforts, both financial and managerial. He can
do that which he knows how to do best — advise others in how to
organize and manage a business more effectively. Third, MESBIC
is a local delivery vehicle that can adapt and blend in to the
total community effort. The SBA can act as a regulatory body
over the MESBICs in the same manner that the Securities and
Exchange Commission regulates normal investment brokers, without
direct government management in local community affairs . The
Federal government can thus maintain a very low profile in the
black communities and let the communities and the private white
sector learn to work together toward a common black determined






create some black businesses that are able to enter the economic
mainstream and some that can make a significant contribution to
the economic development of the ghetto communities.
Recommendations For Change
The first thing needed to make the MESBIC a more viable
instrument of public policy is a better sence of national direc-
tion, purpose and degree of commitment to the needs of black
business and black economic development. Simply stated, this
means that we must determine how badly we want to achieve these
goals, how much of our national resources we are willing to
commit to these purposes and what kind of payoff are we demanding
from our Federal investments.
The President's Advisory Council on Minority Business
Enterprise (PACMBE) has recommended no less than a high national
priority and believes that the creation of a super-bureau to
house the total efforts of such agencies as SBA, OMBE, EDA and
parts of 0E0 and the Department of Agriculture is a must. It also
recommended that this super-bureau, which it calls the Agency
for Expanded Ownership, develop a network of 100 local delivery
centers to act as the focal point of all Federal, local govern-
ment, local community and private industry efforts. This would
allow broad goals and policies to be left on the Federal level,
but allow the local consortium to modify and implement these goals
and policies in light of local needs and conditions
.
Minority Enterprise and Expanded Ownership: Blueprint
for the 70 's, pp. 1-10.
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The President responded to this recommendation by
strengthening the role of OMBE and by establishing these 100
local delivery centers under OMBE's direction. Whether this
less dynamic approach is better or worse than the problems of
creating a new super-bureau must be left to students of political
science to determine. Nevertheless, there now will be a better
local coordinative effort, which in turn may filter up to the
parent agencies. This will provide a better framework in which
a MESBIC can operate more effectively in its ghetto economic
development role.
This leads to the next issue which concerns the role of
the MESBIC itself in the local consortium. The government must
redetermine the objectives of the MESBIC program and structure it
according to the objectives. I contend that we need two varieties
of MESBICs, those focusing on ghetto economic development and
those focusing on the national markets of the economic mainstream.
The ghetto oriented MESBIC can be developed on a lower
capital basis, since it will be supporting more retail and ser-
vice type of needs, and be more diversified in its investment
portfolio. Those sponsoring these MESBICs should be industries
that have this type of expertise, such as grocery, clothing,
hardware, restaurant, banking and entertainment type of indus-
tries . They are geared for consumer marketing efforts and can
be more responsible to the needs of the local develop consortium.
I am not advocating marginal businesses but merely the smaller
U.S. President, Proclamation, "Promoting Minority
Enterprise," Federal Register
,




but potentially viable retail and service businesses that are
necessary in any community.
The economic mainstream type of MESBIC must be capitalized
on a much higher level, since it will be sponsoring manufacturing,
construction and wholesale type of enterprises. These MESBICs
should be allowed to concentrate their total portfolios in one
segment of an industry, such as electronics, in order to capital-
ize on the expertise of the sponsoring firms . They should also
be allowed to develop nearly subsidiary type businesses to ensure
a necessary market for the products of the new concerns. Of
course this aspect will have to be closely monitored by SBA and
an eventual tie-cutting mechanism will be required. But if we
really want to allow these new industries to prosper, we must be
willing to allow some early monopolization. I see no difference
between this and the restrictive quota and tariff mechanisms we
use to protect our industrial giants, such as the steel and
textile industries, from foreign competition.
PACMBE also recommended that we allow non-profit MESBICs
to be formed; that SBA or some other agency such as the Oppor-
tunity Funding Corporation be allowed to rediscount and repackage
MESBICs portfolios to give them a new capital injection;
that SBA be allowed to match MESBICs on a 6 to 1, vice the
current 2 or 3 to 1, basis if total capitalization is in excess
of $1 million; that MESBICs be encouraged to have programs
managed by the local delivery offices; and that better incentives
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be offered to industries in order to encourage them to sponsor
a MESBIC. 1
I do not agree that we should allow for the formation of
non-profit MESBICs since it is likely to turn-off some of the
white businessmen who will want to keep this in the realm of a
business venture. Nor should MESBICs be managed by the local
delivery offices.
The MESBIC should be kept in proper perspective. It
should be the exclusive domain of the majority business community
to sponsor and manage as a capital-providing and managerial-
assisting institution just like a normal investment house. The
MESBIC will be coordinated under the local delivery center
coordinative effort, but as a financial arm. The local delivery
center can better utilize its efforts in developing a broad
business development plan and in seeking out potentially profit-
able business ventures and businessmen. Once these are found,
the MESBIC job begins and the MESBIC/black businessmen relation-
ship should be long and continuing. This also presents one
potential weakness in the PACMBE rediscounting mechanism. While
vitally needed to allow the MESBIC to turn-over its portfolio
more quickly, the MESBIC must be felt to be responsible for the
investment, even if it no longer holds the paperwork to ensure
that it continues the close rapport with its portfolio businesses
One final, but vital, consideration that must be properly
understood is that MESBICs will not become profitable in the
Minority Enterprise and Expanded Ownership: Blueprint
for the 70 ! s . pp. ^7-^9
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short-run or possibly not even in the intermediate -run . OMBE
and SBA insistance that v/hite businessmen should sponsor a MESBIC
on the grounds that it can realize a substantial return on its
investment by the capital gains its portfolio investments will
bring is unrealistic. MESBICs should still remain profit-
oriented but if good sponsors are to be attracted, the program
must allow for more tax write-offs and other direct sponsor incen-
tives to make it worthwhile to invest more substantially in the
MESBIC and to have the sponsor assign really good managerial
talent, and black talent wherever possible, to directing the
MESBIC.
As a final note, the roles of OMBE and SBA must be clearly
defined in the area of who is responsible for what with respect
to MESBICs . OMBE, with its easier access to the corporate giants
by being part of the Commerce Department, might better concen-
trate on marketing the MESBIC product to big business . Once
the sponsors are found, OMBE should let SBA take over from there
in the technical organizing, licensing, and regulating of the
MESBIC. If the roles are clearly defined, conflict can be kept
to a minimum.
Conclusion
In summary, then, there is a vital place for the MESBIC
concept in the redevelopment of the ghettos and in helping
minority enterprises enter the economic mainstream as long as
the goals, objectives, structure and controls of the program are
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properly designed. But if MESBICs are allowed to proceed on
their current non-directed course as a modified SBIC, the
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